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METHADEMIC: DRUG PANIC IN AN AGE OF
AMBIVALENCE
DEBORAH AHRENS*
ABSTRACT
The story of criminal sanctions in modern America is a familiar—and depressing—
narrative. According to the narrative, we live in an era where the dynamics of popular politics, the practices of the media, and the (often racialized) anxieties of modern life combine to
create a one-way ratchet, in which we identify perceived new threats to public order and respond unthinkingly with harsh new criminal sanctions. On the surface, the wave of concern
over methamphetamine that swept the nation in the middle part of this decade followed this
script, as a media panic led to substantial popular concern and significant new legislation.
When one digs a little deeper, however, the story is more complicated: Instead of a singular
focus on increased criminal penalties and mass incarceration, we see a multifaceted strategy
focused on educating the public, limiting access to ingredients, and remediating environmental concerns raised by the manufacture of the drug.
Why has public and legislative concern about a drug described in terms of natural disasters and communicable deadly diseases generated cold medication restrictions and educational programs rather than extensive new criminal law? This Article—the first comprehensive examination of our legal and cultural response to methamphetamine—asks and attempts to answer that question. After providing a succinct history of modern American drug
policy, the Article narrates the wave of coverage that sparked concern about a possible “Methademic” and then catalogs state and local responses to the alleged threat. It concludes by
offering some informed speculation about the possible reasons for this surprisingly tepid response. After considering and rejecting or partially crediting a number of explanations—
most notably that the popular identification of methamphetamine as a “white drug” muted
the expected hostility to its users—the Article concludes that the public response to methamphetamine was, in fact, the first chapter in a new era of drug policy: the age of ambivalence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The mainstream scholarly read of criminal law and sentencing in
the United States is that the nation has in modern times moved only
in one direction, towards increased criminalization of behavior and
lengthier sentences for crimes.1 This expansion of law and creation of
prison cells occurs regardless of whether crime is increasing and
whether empirical studies support its need—either the public demands that the criminal law extend to cover additional conduct and
legislators are only too happy to oblige, or legislators perceive political gains to be possible if they persuade the public that a given behavior is particularly socially dangerous and merits criminalization
or increased punishment. In particular, in the area of illicit drugs,
legislators have expanded codes and increased penalties over the
course of the twentieth century—most strikingly, since the mid1970s—in ways that have dramatically increased our prison population. At this point, the United States imprisons both the largest
number of people and the highest percentage of its citizenry of any

1. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as a “one-way ratchet”: for political
reasons, legislatures can only move in the direction of criminalization and imprisonment.
See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairness in
Federal Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (2007) (describing the United States Sentencing Guidelines Commission’s process of creating guidelines as a “one-way ratchet” increasing sentences); Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World
of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 301 (2005) (describing Congressional adjustments to federal sentencing rules as a “one-way ratchet”); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 719 (2005) (positing that the criminal code expands because politicians have a political incentive to criminalize but not to decriminalize);
Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1293, 1349 (2006) (describing majority rule as a “one-way ratchet” that expands the penal
state); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 507 (2001) (arguing that “all change in criminal law seems to push in the same direction—toward more liability”); Ian Weinstein, The Revenge of Mullaney v. Wilbur: United
States v. Booker and the Reassertion of Judicial Limits on Legislative Power to Define
Crimes, 84 OR. L. REV. 393, 399 (2005) (describing a “one-way ratchet” in which legislation
“only begets more penal law and imposes even harsher sentences”). But see Darryl K.
Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 225 (2007) (arguing that
“[t]he ratchet of crime legislation turns both ways” and describing ongoing legislative efforts to decriminalize behavior).
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nation in the world.2 Scholars and lay commentators, seeking to explain the striking incarceration increase in modern America, often
point to the widespread criminalization of drug use and, in particular, to the increased attention to and enforcement of antidrug laws as
part of the “War on Drugs.”3
After the rash of media articles about methamphetamine in 2005
and 2006,4 an observant student of American criminal sanctions
might have expected to find, ensconced in new methamphetaminerelated legislation, exponentially increased penalties, new mandatory
minimum sentences, life imprisonment for multiple offenses—the
sorts of changes in the law that occurred in response to a perceived
epidemic of crack cocaine during the late 1980s and early 1990s.5 The
one-way ratchet of criminal sanctions would have turned in the direction of code expansion and punishment increase, and sellers, producers, and users of methamphetamine would have expected to find
themselves incarcerated.
Those sorts of changes, however, have not broadly characterized
new methamphetamine legislation. Rather, the bulk of changes have
either restricted the ability of potential methamphetamine manufacturers to access the materials used to generate methamphetamine or
sought to contain the effects of methamphetamine use and production on innocent bystanders who might be exposed to environmental
toxins and laboratory explosions.6 Certainly, some themes that we
have seen with past waves of drug legislation and litigation have
been repeated—in particular, the insulation of children from the effects of drug use and the expansion of Fourth Amendment exceptions
2. The United States has increased its incarcerated population fivefold since the early 1970s. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, by the middle of 2007, 1,595,034
persons were incarcerated in state and federal prisons, and an additional 766,010 persons
were either serving sentences in local jails or held in jail pretrial. See WILLIAM J. SABOL &
HEATHER COUTURE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007, (Jun. 2008)
1, 6, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=840; see also PEW CTR.
ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 3, 5 (2008), available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_2-11_FORWEB.pdf (finding that one in 100 adult Americans currently are incarcerated in jail or
prison, and providing breakdowns of incarceration rates by race and gender). In addition, a
substantial number of Americans, while not incarcerated, are under probation and parole supervision. See generally PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/
One%20in%20100.pdf.
3. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 4 (1995) (discussing the degree to which the “War on Drugs” is responsible for the
mass incarceration of African Americans); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of
Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 381, 393 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he mass incarceration of African Americans is a
direct consequence of the War on Drugs” and offering data to demonstrate more generally
the connection between drug policy and increased incarceration rates).
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part III.B.
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to accommodate law enforcement needs.7 Methamphetamine users,
producers, and traffickers have been prosecuted and incarcerated,8
while some states have increased the penalties for methamphetamine offenses.9 However, in general, the law’s response to the methamphetamine pandemic has been more tempered than recent history might project.10
What explains the difference in legislative response? Perhaps
some of it has to do with race. According to some scholarship on drug
control in the United States, drug prohibition tends to dovetail with
cultural attitudes towards particular groups (generally defined by
race, ethnicity, class, or national origin), and anxiety about particular
subgroups manifests itself through draconian new criminal sanc-

7. See infra Part IV.
8. See, e.g., BUREAU JUST. STAT., FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2005, BUREAU JUS
STATISTICS BULLETIN 2 (September 2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1104 (noting that twenty-two percent of Drug Enforcement
Agency arrests in 2005 were for methamphetamine offenses).
9. See, e.g., Act of May 21, 2004, ch. 845, §§2-3, 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1922, 1923 (codified at Tenn. Code. Ann. §39-17-417 (Supp. 2005)) (lowering the triggering quantity of
methamphetamine for certain sentences from 100 and 1000 grams to 26 and 300 grams).
10. For recent works that note this surprising trend, see DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL
UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 165-66 (2007) (citing evidence about methamphetamine policy and concluding that, when it comes to drug policy, there seem to be “signs that
something may have been learned from past experience”); Michael B. Cassidy, Examining Crack
Cocaine Sentencing in a Post-Kimbrough World, 42 AKRON L. REV. 105, 133-34 (2009) (“Perhaps
a better indicator of Congress’ willingness to change is its handling of the dramatic rise of methamphetamine, which some have termed the ‘new crack.’ In 2006, Congress enacted the first
comprehensive methamphetamine law, which, surprisingly, focuses less on tougher penalties
and more on cutting off access to the ingredients used to manufacture the drug.”); see also Maureen P. Smith, Comment, America’s Methamphetamine Crisis: Solving One of America’s Leading
Drug Problems Through Child Abuse and Nuisance Laws, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 612 (2008)
(advocating the use of nuisance and, to a lesser extent, child abuse laws as primary tools for
fighting methamphetamine despite offering a hyperbolic account of current problems caused by
the drug).
The academic literature on our cultural and legal response to methamphetamine is still in
its infancy. The leading sociologists and criminologists who study drug policy have thus far been
surprisingly silent about methamphetamine. A few law journals have published scattered pieces—often student works—cataloging and critiquing some meth-related legislations. See, e.g.,
Maureen P. Smith, Note, Cooking Up Solutions to a Cooked Up Menace: Responses to Methamphetamine in a Federal System, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2508 (2006); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, Imagining the Addict: Evaluating Social and Legal Responses to Addiction, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 175
(comparing media coverage of and legal response to methamphetamine addiction with the very
different response to tobacco addiction). The Sentencing Project, an academically-inclined advocacy organization, has published one significant study: RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, THE NEXT BIG THING? METHAMPHETAMINE IN THE UNITED STATES (2006), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_nextbigthing_meth.pdf. Popular commentators have shown a bit more interest. See, e.g., DIRK JOHNSON, METH: THE HOME-COOKED
MENACE: HOW A LETHAL DRUG IS DEVASTATING OUR COMMUNITIES AND WHAT’S BEING DONE
ABOUT IT (2005) (offering a hyperbolic account of meth use and its consequences); NICK REDING,
METHLAND: THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AN AMERICAN SMALL TOWN (2009) (offering a more
nuanced portrait of meth use and its consequences, one that largely portrays meth use as an effect—rather than a cause—of the decline of rural America).
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tions.11 A common interpretation of the harsh response to crack cocaine, for example, is that the perceived epidemic coincided with anxiety about urban crime and racially-tinged animosity against what
were perceived as mostly African-American users and sellers; the resulting expansive sanctions reflected racism against African Americans.12 Perhaps the comparatively sanguine reaction to methamphetamine results from the fact that the majority of users are white.13
Relatedly, perhaps the fact that the majority of methamphetamine
users are white has changed the incentives for press, police, and politicians. If past drug hysteria was fueled by racialized bias and anxiety, and the press, public, and law enforcement officials have—due to
the race of most methamphetamine users—tempered their responses
and couched descriptions of the perceived methamphetamine epidemic in less florid language than they have used in the past, they may
have produced a climate in which there is simply less demand for a
draconian legal response.14 Alternatively, the pressure for legislative
change might flow from legislators and executives themselves: representatives and administrators might cynically perceive that they can
increase personal or institutional power by persuading the public
that there exists a serious problem with a particular substance or a
group that might be linked to that substance. Perhaps officials believe that they have less to gain with harsh rhetoric and legislation
where a drug-linked group is Caucasian.
These theories go some distance, perhaps, in explaining the difference between past legislative responses to drug use and the current
response to the use, sale, and manufacture of methamphetamine, but
they are insufficient to provide a full account. To the contrary, there
is increasing evidence that something bigger is going on: careful and
contextual examination of our cultural and legislative response to
methamphetamine suggests that public attitudes towards drug regulation more generally seem to be changing. There is increasing evidence that the current legislative climate seems generally hostile to
ratcheting up criminal sanctions for drug crimes and that the public
appetite for harsh sanctions has begun to wane.15 The “one-way rat11. See, e.g., JAMES B. BAKALAR & LESTER GRINSPOON, DRUG CONTROL IN A FREE
SOCIETY 69 (1998) (“Attitudes toward minorities, work, worldly success and failure, or sex
and family life sometimes turn out to be the real issues in a controversy about drugs.
Drugs are symbols charged with cultural tensions.”).
12. For discussion of the role that race played in fueling the legislative and cultural
response to crack cocaine, see infra Part II.B and the works cited therein.
13. For data on the racial composition of those using or selling methamphetamine, see
infra notes 115-16 & 210 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part V.A.2.
15. For a discussion of this trend in the context of methamphetamine, see infra Part III.
For some recent high-profile incidents in which the trend has played out more broadly, see,
for example, Theo Emery, Will Crack Cocaine Sentencing Reform Help Current Cons?, TIME ,
Aug 7, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1915131,00.html
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chet” as applied to drug offenses is beginning, in some high-profile
instances, to spin in the opposite direction.
In Part II of this Article, I offer a brief overview of drug policy in the
United States, focusing on the link between sanctions for drug offenses
and the subgroups against which those sanctions have been targeted.
In particular, I focus on the literature surrounding the crack cocaine
pandemic of the late 1980s and the legislative response to concern expressed by the public and by the media. In Part III, I provide a synopsis of state and federal legislative responses to methamphetamine. In
Part IV, I analyze ways in which these responses resemble and depart
from past responses to perceived epidemics of drug use. Finally, in
Part V, I provide explanations for why these responses are more tempered than what history might have predicted.
President Barack Obama’s administration recently, and with little
fanfare, declared that the “War on Drugs” has come to a close.16
While that announcement—and the policy shifts it represents—do
not signal that we have entered an era of drug legalization, they do
suggest that we have entered a new era in drug policy. As it turns
out, the American appetite for criminalization and incarceration is
not insatiable.
II. A (RELATIVELY) BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN DRUG POLICY
The application of criminal sanctions to the use, sale, and manufacture of various drugs is a relatively modern phenomenon. Until
the twentieth century, American criminal law did not encompass
what we would now think of as illicit drugs; substances such as
opium and cocaine were in fact commonly available in products manufactured legally and designed for mass consumption.17 In Subpart A,
(quoting President Obama, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of criminal law issues,
and the Chair of Federal Sentencing Commission on the need to eliminate the infamous
crack-powder cocaine sentencing disparity, citing legislative progress on such reform, and
predicting that “this may be the year” that the disparity is eliminated); Gary Fields, White
House Czar Calls for End to “War on Drugs,” WALL ST. J., May 14, 2009, at A3 (quoting new
federal Drug Czar Gil Kerlikowske’s repudiation of the language, and some of the policies, of
the so-called “War on Drugs”); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (allowing judges discretion to sentence individuals convicted of crack cocaine crimes to lesser terms
based on judges’ personal disapproval of crack/powder disparity).
16. See Fields, supra note 15.
17. See LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, COCAINE: A DRUG AND ITS SOCIAL
EVOLUTION 28 (1976) (noting that cocaine-containing Coca-Cola was essential in putting
drugstore soda fountains at the center of 1890s culture); LESTER GRINSPOON & PETER
HEDBLOM, THE SPEED CULTURE: AMPHETAMINE USE AND ABUSE IN AMERICA 185-86 (1975)
(listing over-the-counter medications available at the end of the nineteenth century, such
as the morphine-laced Dr. Grove’s Anodyne for Infants and Dr. Moffett’s Teething Compound); Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Punitive Prohibition in America, in CRACK IN
AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 323 (Craig Reinaman & Harry G. Levine,
eds., 1997) (noting that Coca-Cola, advertised as a temperate “soft drink” alternative to alcohol, contained cocaine, and groceries vended opium-based medications).
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I offer a short history of legislative decisions to criminalize and increase penalties attendant to trade and possession of various substances, viewed through the lens of the most common explanation for
the growth of such policies, which sees them as an attempt to mark
and constrain racial and other minorities who threaten the peace or
self-image of traditional majorities. In Subpart B, I focus on the literature surrounding legislative responses to crack cocaine, the most
high-profile and thoroughly-dissected recent chapter in American
drug policy.
A. The Twentieth Century and Drug Policy Development
What we now think of as illicit drugs were once widely available
in the United States and untouched by criminal law.18 The various
legislative developments attaching criminal sanctions to illicit drugs
are creatures of the twentieth century, and those developments have
corresponded, per many academic commentators, with periods of concern about population groups associated with those substances.19 According to perhaps the most common critical narrative of United
States drug policy, changes in the criminal law as applied to illicit
drugs come not at times of actual increases in drug use or drugrelated social problems; rather, at times of anxiety about particular
disfavored social groups, the panicking public develops drug laws to
regulate and punish the use and sale of drugs stereotypically associated with the disfavored group.20 While the substances described

18. See, e.g., DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC
CONTROL, 1-2 (3d ed. 1999) (describing the popularity of opium use medically and recreationally during the nineteenth century and noting that opium use and trade was restricted
only by tariff until 1909).
19. For some of the academic works central to establishing this narrative, see generally MUSTO, supra note 18; TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY: LAW, DRUGS, AND
MORAL JUDGMENT (1970); JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND
THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963). For a more recent work that effectively
summarizes and updates this narrative, see PROVINE, supra note 10; see also Erik Grant
Luna, Our Vietnam: The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 483, 486-512 (1997)
(summarizing the history of American drug policy in terms largely consistent with these
works and with this Article).
20. This thesis has not gone unchallenged. For works that are at least skeptical of the
idea that drug policy has primarily been about attacking disfavored social groups, see, for
example, BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 11, at 68-72 (discussing forces that have contributed to modern drug control policies and emphasizing the fact that “drugs are not just
symbols; they are substances with distinct chemical properties and physical and psychological effects”); GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 39-40 (“Naturally, then, many
people think that racial prejudice inspired the hostility toward cocaine . . . . But we suspect
that racial prejudice was ancillary.”); Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial
Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255-56 (1994) (critiquing scholarship
and a then-recent court decision equating crack-powder cocaine disparity with racial targeting of African-Americans and arguing that police indifference to effects of crime on AfricanAmerican communities is a bigger problem and a more virulent form of racism).
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here doubtlessly can be dangerous for personal use and lead to negative social consequences for the communities in which users21 live,
the policy responses to those dangers and consequences are perhaps
not those that rational legislatures would devise.
1. The Temperance Movement
While antidrug movements and legislation are twentieth-century
developments, they were predated by a temperance movement against
alcohol. Temperance advocates linked alcohol consumption to immigrant groups (particularly Irish and Italian immigrants) who were also
at the time racialized as nonwhite.22 Advocates blamed alcohol consumption among these groups for a host of social ills, including domestic abuse, thievery, and violent crime.23 In examining the temperance
movement’s reasons for drawing a connection between alcohol use and
these social problems, Joseph Gusfield has argued that temperance
“was one way in which a declining social elite tried to retain some of its
social power and leadership.”24 The politics of temperance was focused
on reinforcing both the distinction between the rural, middle-class, native Protestant and the poor urban immigrant and the social dominance of the former.25 Still, in terms of operationalizing its goals, the
temperance movement sought “regulatory prohibition”—preventing
persons from accessing alcohol through civil and administrative rules,
rather than through the use of criminal law. While temperance advocates sought to eliminate the use of alcohol, individual use was never
criminalized.26 In other words, while the temperance movement
wished to limit consumption of alcohol, and cast its arguments in moral terms, it did not seek to bring to bear the severe social stigma associated with criminal conviction and punishment.27
21. I refer throughout this Article to substance users, rather than substance addicts
or abusers. As discussed below, not all persons who use drugs recreationally use them often
or otherwise exhibit signs of addiction and abuse.
22. The classic account of the racial and ethnic politics at the heart of the temperance
debate is GUSFIELD, supra note 19; cf. MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE
FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865 (1981) (examining the milieu in which
the American temperance movement first emerged and locating its impulse in a complex
web of ethnic, class, and religious animosities). For two provocatively titled accounts of the
ways in which American culture and politics once racialized particular European ethnic
groups, see NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1996); DAVID ROEDIGER,
WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS: HOW AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS BECAME WHITE: THE
STRANGE JOURNEY FROM ELLIS ISLAND TO THE SUBURBS (2006).
23. See, e.g., Reinarman & Levine, supra note 17, at 323.
24. GUSFIELD, supra note 19, at 5-6 (arguing that temperance was essential to distinguishing the middle class, the hard worker, and the native American from the lower class,
the layabout, and the immigrant).
25. Id. at 6, 55-57.
26. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 17, at 323.
27. The Temperance Movement did enjoy short-lived success in the form of the Volstead Act and the Twenty-First Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (1919), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (1933); National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), 41 Stat.
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2. The Racialization of Opiates and Narcotics
Early efforts to restrict access to substances such as opium, cocaine, and marijuana similarly involved regulatory prohibition rather
than the use of criminal law. Preliminary state laws required prescriptions for or otherwise limited the ability of consumers to purchase opium and cocaine.28
The linkage between concern about particular social groups and
increased regulations of substances associated with that group, first
noted with regard to the Temperance Movement, manifested itself in
new ways during the early twentieth century. As David Musto argues, during that era, drug addiction became associated with “foreign
groups and internal minorities who were already actively feared and
the objects of elaborate and massive social and legal restraints.”29 In
particular, drug use was tied to Chinese immigrants and African
Americans. Americans associated opium smoking, for example, with
Chinese immigrants, against whom they were already mobilizing
other restrictive legal tools (particularly immigration controls). 30
Initially, the response to increased concern about drug use was
once again regulatory. For example, the Harrison Narcotics Act,31
adopted by Congress in 1914, required producers and distributors to
register with the government, track transactions, and pay special
taxes for handling drugs; unregistered persons could purchase drugs
only by prescription or for medical use.32 Still, unlawful possession of
a drug was not criminalized; it might furnish evidence that the tax
and regulatory schemes had been violated, but it did not subject the

305 (1919), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (1933). States retain wide latitude to regulate alcohol under the Twenty-First Amendment, but the great bulk of jurisdictions
permit the sale of alcohol and limit themselves to time, place, and manner restrictions
(such as laws confining sales to particular days, hours, or locations, limiting the ability of
buyers to purchase small, inexpensive “minibottles,” prohibiting overservice, restricting
drinking for persons under the age of twenty-one, preventing restaurants from serving alcohol on Sundays, or prohibiting public drunkenness). Even jurisdictions that prohibit the
sale of intoxicating liquors do not criminalize “responsible” use of alcohol by persons over
the age of twenty-one.
For a new and interesting take on the relationship between alcohol and drug regulation,
see GEORGE FISHER, MARRIED TO ALCOHOL: THE DRUG WAR’S MORAL ROOTS (forthcoming).
28. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 40 (as of 1912, fourteen states had
established school-based drug education to warn about cocaine and opium; as of 1914, forty-six states had some restrictions on cocaine purchases, and twenty-nine states had some
restrictions for opium purchases).
29. MUSTO, supra note 18, at 5.
30. See id. at 3; GRINSPOON & HEDBLOM, supra note 17, at 185 (noting a shift in public attitudes about opiates from a sympathetic association with white, wounded, morphine-addicted
Civil War soldiers to negative associations with opium-using Chinese laborers).
31. Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
32. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 41 (describing the Act).
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violator to criminal sanctions. And to the extent that states prohibited narcotics distribution, enforcement was lax.33
By 1931, the landscape had changed. As of 1931, thirty-six states
made unauthorized possession of cocaine a criminal offense, and in
1951, federal law began to impose mandatory prison sentences for cocaine possession.34 While this shift to criminal regulation has never been
fully explained, it does correlate with an explosion of racialized imagery
and a deepening of social anxiety about minority groups. During this
era, concern about the large Chinese labor force in western states hit a
fever pitch. Stories about Chinese immigrants using opium to lure white
women into sexual slavery proliferated. Similar complaints about the
use of opium by other “inferior” and “debased” people—Italian, Jewish,
and central European immigrants—began to appear; such individuals
were thought to be engaging in behaviors “contrary to white supremacy
and white morality.”35 By the end of World War II, heroin had largely
supplanted opium as the opiate of choice, and “racial and social prejudices” against black and Hispanic users “helped solidify national attitudes” against heroin and opium use.36
After years of being considered a health tonic, American opinion of
cocaine turned to one of censure, as cocaine use became associated in
the popular mind with various disfavored social groups,37 in particular African Americans.38 Fear of cocaine-using African Americans
came at a time when lynching, disenfranchisement, and legallyenforced segregation were still central features of the American landscape.39 Some whites envisioned horrific encounters in which African
Americas cocaine-users would develop violent, superhuman strength
and would foil law enforcement attempts to subdue them; some stories went so far as to suggest that such cocaine users would act as if
invulnerable to bullets.40 Narratives abounded about cocaine-fueled

33. See MUSTO, supra note 18, at 9 (explaining that states generally lacked sufficient
manpower to enforce narcotics restrictions).
34. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 42 (cataloging these changes).
35. GRINSPOON & HEDBLOM, supra note 17, at 185.
36. Id. at 188.
37. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 39; see also Preface to the Expanded
Edition of MUSTO, supra note 18, at x (noting that cocaine, once viewed as “an ideal tonic,”
was reconstructed as “the most dangerous of all drugs” by 1900).
38. See generally MUSTO, supra note 18, at 43-44 (noting the association between African Americans and cocaine in a variety of sources). Ironically, African Americans did not in
fact use cocaine in numbers greater than, or even equal to whites. See GRINSPOON &
BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 40 (arguing that African Americans probably had less access to
cocaine because of their relative poverty, and noting that the best documented cocaine addiction cases were white professional men, particularly doctors); see also MUSTO, supra
note 18, at 8.
39. See MUSTO, supra note 18, at 7.
40. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 39.
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men raping Caucasian women.41 It is with regard to cocaine that the
now-familiar narrative first became explicit: we must prohibit and
criminalize drug possession to prevent dangerous people from accessing dangerous substances.42
3. Marijuana (and LSD)
Marijuana legislation similarly dovetailed with prejudice. As marijuana use became linked with Mexican immigrants, government
concern and expanded sanction followed apace.43 During the 1930s,
for example, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics conducted a raciallytinged educational campaign describing marijuana as such a potent
criminological agent that a single use could transform an upstanding
citizen into a violent criminal.44
The history of marijuana regulation nicely illustrates that the disfavored subgroup theory is not uniformly about race, ethnicity, or
immigration. In the 1960s and early 1970s, a new round of drug
regulation followed quickly45 as some drugs—marijuana and LSD, in
particular—became associated with a band of political and cultural
dissenters.46 Drug use became an axis on which dissenters explicitly
set themselves apart and drug policy served as a mechanism through
which the cultural majority reinforced its status as the embodiment
of moral norms.47 Through this lens, attention to drug use in the
41. See id. at 38-39 (detailing how cocaine was linked in media articles to AfricanAmerican convicts, lower economic classes, Jewish vendors, prostitutes, and poorlybehaved soldiers).
42. See id. at 40. Like with marijuana, see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text,
the cultural anxieties that spawned the crackdown on cocaine transcended race. Grinspoon
and Bakalar argue that racial prejudice was probably ancillary to a general desire to keep
cocaine out of the hands of all potentially “dangerous” persons, including white women who
might be seduced or corrupted by exposure to cocaine. See id.
43. On the association of marijuana with Mexican immigrants, see, for example, H.
WAYNE MORGAN, DRUGS IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1800-1980 93-94 (1981). For the
story of the passage of the first significant federal law regulating marijuana and the climate of panic that facilitated that legislation, see HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS:
STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 135-46 (1973).
44. See BECKER, supra note 43, at 135-46; GRINSPOON & HEDBLOM, supra note 17, at 182.
Grinspoon and Hedblom note that no data support or supported this assertion. Id. at 183.
45. The most famous (and probably the most draconian) laws adopted during this era
were New York’s so-called “Rockefeller Drug Laws,” which (until their recent amendment)
imposed significant mandatory prison sentences for relatively minor drug infractions. See,
e.g., Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 276 §§220.21, 220.43, 1973 N.Y. Laws 371, 380-81 (codified as
amended in N.Y. Penal Law) (classifying criminal possession of two or more ounces of a
controlled substance and criminal sale of one or more ounces of a controlled substance as
Class A-I felonies).
46. See Reinarman & Levine, Crack in Context, in CRACK IN AMERICA, supra note 17,
at 7-8 (arguing that marijuana in the 1960s and 1970s became associated with youthful rebellion against achievement and opposition to the Vietnam War, creating a “dangerous”
youth class and “a useful symbol in an essentially political conflict between cultures and
generations.”). This analysis draws upon the earlier work of Professor Becker. See generally BECKER, supra note, 43.
47. See Reinarman & Levine supra note 46.
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1960s and early 1970s was less about reducing the possible personal
or social harm associated with drug use than it was about reinforcing
the majority’s status; like in the periods preceding and following,
drug legislation during this era was often a proxy for cultural contestation between competing social groups.
B. Crackademic: The 1980s and Beyond
The crack cocaine panic of the late 1980s probably has received
the most attention, in the scholarly press and in the popular media,
of any of the various drug panics of the past century. Sociologists
Craig Reinerman and Harry Levine have documented exhaustively
and persuasively the press coverage of the crack cocaine “epidemic,”
the timing of that coverage relative to documented trends in crack cocaine use, the extent to which press coverage reflected accurate information about crack cocaine effects, and the effects of press and
public response on crack cocaine litigation and legislation.48 During
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the “one way ratchet” turned with a
vengeance. The resulting system of crack cocaine laws persists into
the present: lengthier terms of imprisonment, mandatory minimum
sentences, parole and probation ineligibility, and penalties that escalate with increased numbers of convictions.49
Cocaine was not a new drug when coverage of a purported epidemic
of crack cocaine use began. Cocaine, as discussed earlier, had been
used throughout the twentieth century, and its use had long violated
criminal law.50 In surveying cocaine use in the United States as of
1976, Lester Greenspoon and James Bakalar observed that cocaine “is
rapidly attaining unofficial respectability . . . . It is accepted as a relatively innocuous stimulant, casually used by those who can afford it to
brighten the day or the evening . . . . Use of cocaine is gradually
spreading in the upper middle class.”51 Greenspoon and Bakalar noted
that at the time that they were writing, “[w]ith a few minor exceptions,
no one contends that coca causes any significant crime [or] violence.”52
Whatever Greenspoon and Bakalar might have predicted about
the trajectory of social attitudes towards cocaine in the mid-1970s, by
the mid-1980s, the trajectory clearly changed, at least with respect to

48. See generally Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror:
Deconstructing Drug War Mythology, 31 SOC. JUST. 182 (2004); CRACK IN AMERICA, supra
note 17.
49. See, e.g., Reinarman & Levine, supra note 17, at 321-22 (arguing that such escalating sanctions have typified the U.S. response to drugs and quoting government documents that demonstrate the intentionality of such a regime).
50. See supra Part II.A.2.
51. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 64.
52. Id. at 218.
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one particular form of cocaine—crack.53 Smoking cocaine to obtain a
high was not new—cocaine users had for some time used cocaine by
“freebasing.”54 What was new was the attention to and panic about
smokable cocaine.
The media coverage of crack cocaine began in earnest in 1986, and
was promptly distinguished by both its volume and its remarkable
levels of hyperbole and disinformation.55 Newsweek quoted an expert
who described crack as a drug that produced an “instantaneous addiction” more severe than any other;56 the New York Times and
Newsweek compared crack cocaine to an epidemic or plague;57 and
media sources generally described the wildfire spread, epidemic use,
plague proportions, and addictive properties of crack cocaine58 in
ways that their own later coverage found factually incorrect.59 Crack
cocaine was linked to violent crime.60 As Reinarman and Levine ar-

53. Crack cocaine is a smokeable form of cocaine produced by “cooking down” a mixture of powder cocaine, water, and baking powder. While cocaine has long been present in
this country and has been smoked extensively since at least the early 1970s, the diluted,
relatively inexpensive “cooked down” cocaine that came to be know as “crack” emerged in
urban areas in 1984 and 1985. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 46, at 1, 2 (explaining
the emergence of “crack”). As Professors Reinarman and Levine explain “Crack was not a
new drug . . . . Crack was a marketing innovation.” Id.
54. See Beverly Xaviera Watkins & Mindy Thompson Fullilove, The Crack Epidemic
and the Failure of Epidemic Reponse, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 377 (2001)
(describing 1979 testimony before Congress warning of the dangers of “free-base cocaine”).
55. Reinarman and Levine describe the press coverage of crack cocaine as a “media
frenzy,” noting that in July of 1986, “the three major TV networks offered seventy-four
evening news segments on drugs, half of these about crack.” Reinarman & Levine, The
Crack Attack: Politics and Media in the Crack Scare, in CRACK IN AMERICA, supra note 17,
at 19-22. See generally JIMMIE L. REEVES & RICHARD CAMPBELL, CRACKED COVERAGE:
TELEVISION NEWS, THE ANTI-COCAINE CRUSADE, AND THE REAGAN LEGACY (1994) (cataloging and critiquing television coverage of drugs during the 1980s and early 1990s); cf.
MARTIN TORGOFF, CAN’T FIND MY WAY HOME: AMERICA IN THE GREAT STONED AGE,
1945—2000, 350-57 (2004) (narrating the key mileposts of the press coverage and explaining how press portrayal played into themes of a larger culture war).
56. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 46, at 3 (citing Kids and Cocaine NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 1, 1986, at 58-59).
57. See id. at 3-4; see also Reinarman & Levine, supra note 55, at 24 (citing New York
Times/CBS News polling data that indicated that in January of 1985, 1% of Americans
considered drugs to be the most important problem facing the United States; by September
of 1989, that figure had risen to 64%).
58. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 55, at 20-22 (describing in depth the nature
and timeline of mass media coverage of crack cocaine and noting that “plague,” “epidemic,”
and “crisis” were descriptors commonly employed in press coverage).
59. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 46, at 4 (noting that, by 1989 or 1990, many major news outlets were running stories quietly critical of their own initial coverage of “crack”).
60. See, e.g., Paul J. Goldstein, et al., Crack and Homicide in New York City: A Case
Study in the Epidemiology of Violence, in CRACK IN AMERICA, supra note 17, at 113, 122-24
(noting media coverage and political rhetoric about “crack-related murders” and finding,
based on 1988 homicide data from New York City, that while a majority of drug-related homicides in New York City did involve cocaine or crack cocaine, most of the homicides had to do
with the risks of the illicit drug market, as opposed to the psychopharmacological effects of
cocaine or crack cocaine); Watkins & Fullilove, supra note 54, at 375 (noting media coverage
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gue, the overwhelming majority of young people in the United States,
during the time of hysterical coverage, were not using crack cocaine,
and the overwhelming majority of people who had used crack cocaine
had not continued to use it with any frequency.61 By most measures,
in the late 1980s, drug use generally—and cocaine use specifically—
was in decline.62 Despite the fact that fewer Americans were using
drugs, by 1989, the majority of Americans polled identified the most
important problem facing the United States as “drugs.”63
Crack cocaine also produced headlines and prosecutions related to
an alleged “crack baby” epidemic, where, per the media and other
sources, crack cocaine caused large numbers of infants to suffer severe, irreversible health problems resulting from maternal use of
crack cocaine. In 1985 and 1986, major news outlets began reporting
that crack cocaine-exposed babies might comprise a “biological underclass” suffering from, among other things, permanent mental retardation, deviance, and an inability to perform basic self-care
tasks.64 The idea of a permanent underclass of crack-cocaine-ruined
children captured the public imagination.65 Reports on the “crack baby” phenomenon proved medically unfounded—cocaine exposure affects newborns, but does not create a particular “crack baby” syndrome with the terrifying symptoms and developmental debilitation
of crack cocaine in 1985 and 1986 that, focusing on violence, described crack cocaine addiction
as “growing at alarming rates” and creating “an authentic national crisis.”).
61. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 48, at 186 (noting that during the period of
the crack cocaine scare into the early 2000s, fewer than five percent of eighteen to twentynine year olds ever tried crack, and of those who had tried it, 80% had not used crack cocaine within the past year and over 90% had not used it within the past month); id. at 188
(noting that crack cocaine usage “did not spread far beyond the most marginalized and
vulnerable segments of society”); id. at 189 (noting that per National Institute on Drug
Abuse surveys, the use of crack cocaine among high school seniors declined every year from
1986 through 1991, while media articles were writing about the “epidemic” spread of crack
cocaine use).
62. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 55, at 18, 27-28 (surveying drug use data to
conclude that by the time crack cocaine coverage began in earnest, drug use generally and
cocaine and crack cocaine use specifically were in decline, and noting that 1982 was the
high water mark for lifetime cocaine use among young Americans). Moreover, during the
period in which media articles about crack cocaine proliferated, most cocaine users were
“sniffing, rather than smoking,” the drug. Id. at 28.
63. See id., supra note 55, at 24 (citing New York Times/CBS News polling data).
64. See generally Reinarman & Levine, supra note 48, at 192 (describing the content of
articles and features in Newsweek, the Washington Post, and on CBS Evening News); Loren
Siegel, The Pregnancy Police Fight the War on Drugs, in CRACK IN AMERICA at 249, 255, supra
note 17, (summarizing late-1980s media articles about the “crack baby” phenomenon).
65. Chapters of Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity (C.R.A.C.K.) can be found in
several major cities; the program pays women who are addicted to drugs $200 to undergo
sterilization or use long-term birth control such as IUDs. See generally Adam B. Wolf, Note,
What Money Cannot Buy: A Legislative Response to C.R.A.C.K., 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
173 (1999) (arguing for legislation to prevent C.R.A.C.K. from offering money in exchange
for permanent sterilization or long-term birth control). The majority of women who have
utilized the program are women of color. Id. at 178 (sixty-three percent of women who have
participated in the C.R.A.C.K. program are African-American or Latina).
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initially described.66 Rather, many of the health problems found with
babies born to mothers who had used crack were attributable to lack
of prenatal care, poor nutrition and personal care, and co-existing
substance use such as tobacco and alcohol.67 The “crack baby” image
has, however, endured, and has left in its wake legislative changes
and creative prosecution strategies designed to apply criminal sanctions to women who expose developing fetuses to crack.68
66. See, e.g., Deborah A. Frank et. al., Growth, Development, and Behavior in Early
Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Systematic Review, 285 JAMA 1613,
1619 (2001) (effects of prenatal cocaine exposure are indiscernible once tobacco and alcohol
exposure are controlled); L.C. Mayesm, et al., Commentary: The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Rush to Judgment, 267 JAMA 406-08 (1992) (arguing, fairly soon after
height of “crack baby” scare, that popular fears were likely overstated); Patrick Zickler,
NIDA Studies Clarify Developmental Effects of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure, 14 NAT’L INST.
ON
DRUG
ABUSE
NOTES
(Sept.
1999),
available
at
http://archives.drugabuse.gov/NIDA_Notes/NNVol14N3/Prenatal.html (summarizing the
position of the National Institute on Drug Abuse that cocaine delays motor skill and intellectual development, but that such effects are “not as profound” as early reports indicated
and that it is difficult for researches to isolate the effects of cocaine from those of poor prenatal care, poor self-care, coexisting drug use, and other factors known to negatively affect
development); Cocaine Pharmacology, “Crack Babies,” Violence: Hearings Before the U.S.
Sent’g Comm’n, (Feb. 25, 2002) (statement of Deborah Frank, M.D.), reprinted in 14 FED.
SENT’G REP. 191, 196 (2002) (concluding, based on ten years of study at a National Institute on Drug Abuse project following developmental and behavioral outcomes for crack cocaine exposed babies, that crack cocaine does not affect babies differently than powder cocaine; that the effects of the drug are similar to those caused by tobacco; that there is no
“crack baby” syndrome; and that early studies identifying such a syndrome were deeply
flawed); see also 846 ANNALS OF N. Y. ACAD. SCI., John A. Harvey & Barry E. Kosofsky,
eds., COCAINE: EFFECTS ON THE DEVELOPING BRAIN, at xi (1998) (making similar arguments).
Dr. Ira Chasnoff, whose early anecdotal observations of babies born to crack-using
mothers helped fuel the medial coverage, concluded after further research that he had
“never seen a ‘crack kid.’ ” Ira J. Chasnoff, Missing Pieces of the Puzzle, 15
NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 287, 288 (1993). Dr. Deborah Frank, a leading expert in
children’s’ failure to thrive, concluded that the public outcry for the punishment of substance-using mothers and the disenfranchisement of their children as an unsalvageable,
almost demonic “biological underclass . . . rest[s] not on scientific findings but upon media
hysteria fueled by selected anecdotes.” Deborah A. Frank, Commentary: Children Exposed
to Cocaine Prenatally: Pieces of the Puzzle, 15 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 298, 299
(1993).
67. See Ira Glasser & Loren Siegel, When Constitutional Rights Seem Too Extravagant to Endure: The Crack Scare’s Impact on Civil Rights and Liberties, in CRACK IN
AMERICA, supra note 17 at 229, 241-42.
68. Prosecutors have employed existing child abuse statutes to prosecute women who
test positive for drug use during pregnancy or whose newborn infants test positive for illicit
drug use, particularly cocaine use. Prosecution strategies have ranged from coercive (designed to convince a drug-using pregnant women to seek treatment or face prosecution and
incarceration) to directly punitive (criminally sanctioning women who use drugs while
pregnant). See LAURA E. GÓMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS,
AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 78 (1997).
These strategies generally have not survived scrutiny from reviewing courts. See, e.g.,
Siegel, supra note 64, at 249 (describing cases in North Carolina, Virginia, and New York
where prosecutors initially charged women who ingested cocaine while pregnant with assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, felony child neglect, and endangering the welfare of
a child; these indictments, as well as most similar indictments, were dismissed). In Ferguson
v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), for example, the United States Supreme Court re-
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Crack cocaine was portrayed and perceived as something far more
addictive and far more menacing than powder cocaine or any other
drug. The legislative reaction to public and media concern about crack
cocaine was swift and severe.69 States enacted new mandatory minimum sentences requiring offenders to serve prison time; increased
available statutory maximums; and in some cases, provided mandatory life without parole for crack-cocaine offenses.70 At the federal level,
Congress included among its responses the now-infamous “100:1 rajected one such program, a cooperative effort between the Medical University of South Carolina, the Charleston, South Carolina Solicitor’s Office, the Department of Social Services, the
County Substance Abuse Commission, and the local police. 532 U.S. at 71, 81-82. Per this
program, pregnant patients suspected of illicit drug use were subjected to urine drug screens.
Id. at 71. Patients who tested positive for cocaine use prior to 28 weeks could be charged with
simple possession of cocaine; after 28 weeks, to possession and distribution to a person under
the age of 18; and at delivery, with the additional offense of unlawful neglect of a child. Id. at
71-72. The Supreme Court held that this program comprised a Fourth Amendment search
that did not comport with the special needs exception from the generalized requirement of a
warrant and probable cause. Id. at 81-82.
State courts have similarly rejected prosecutions of women for child abuse based on
drug use during pregnancy. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195, 1198 (N.M. Ct. App.
2006) (refusing to extend state’s child abuse statute to cover fetuses). Though prosecutors
have attempted to utilize a wide variety of statutes—including child abuse, child endangerment, and delivery of a controlled substance—most state courts similarly have declined
to read existing statutes as holding drug-using pregnant women criminally responsible for
the potential exposure of their fetuses. See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court of Ariz., 894
P.2d 733, 737 (AZ. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting use of child abuse statute); People v. Hardy,
469 N.W. 2d 50, 55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting use of delivery of cocaine charge).; State
v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ohio 1992) (rejecting child endangerment charge); State v.
Dunn, 916 P.2d 952, 956 (Wash. App. 1996) (rejecting use of mistreatment of child statute);
cf. State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting use of reckless homicide and related charges against mother who was drunk when she delivered a
stillborn fetus). South Carolina, on the other hand, has permitted women to be prosecuted
for offenses based on fetal exposure to maternally ingested drugs. See State v. McKnight,
576 S.E.2d 168, 174-75 (S.C. 2003) (permitting woman to be prosecuted for homicide by
child abuse where woman had used cocaine during pregnancy and fetus was stillborn);
Whitner v. State, 492 S.E. 2d 777, 782 (1997) (permitting child endangerment prosecution
where pregnant woman ingested cocaine); see also Ellen Marrus, Crack Babies and the
Constitution: Ruminations About Addicted Pregnant Women After Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 47 VILL. L. REV. 299, 301-02 (2003) (describing various state strategies for
prosecuting pregnant drug-using women and noting that courts generally have rejected
such strategies). Women not charged specifically with offenses related to ingesting drugs
while pregnant may face stiffer sentences from judges who believe that jail or prison might
ensure that pregnant women stop using drugs. See Siegel, supra note 64, at 250-51.
Legislative efforts to create new statutes to permit specifically the prosecution of
drug-using pregnant women, while popular, never led to specific sanctions against drugusing pregnant women. See Lynn M. Paltrow et al. Governmental Responses to Pregnant
Women Who Use Alcohol or Other Drugs, Part 1, WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT AND NAT’L
ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/
library/governmental_response_p1.cfm.
69. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 55, at 21 (noting that in 1986, “overwhelming
majorities of both houses of Congress voted for new antidrug laws with long mandatory prison terms, death sentences, and large increases in funding for police and prisons”).
70. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 601 U.S. 957, 1028 (1991) (rejecting an Eighth
Amendment challenge to a Michigan law providing for a mandatory life sentence for possession of a relatively minor amount of cocaine).
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tio”—the United States Sentencing Guidelines require 100 grams of
powder cocaine to trigger the same mandatory minimum sentence as
one gram of crack cocaine, and this ratio is included in the Guidelines
generally for cocaine and crack-cocaine offenses.71 These legislative
responses to crack cocaine, which treated it as a new and more serious
drug than powder cocaine, may explain some of the racial differences
in incarceration rates.72 What the legislative response to crack cocaine
did not include was much by way of a public health response; government “focused less on standard public health practice and . . . more on
the courts, the police, and the prisons.”73
If by the time legislation and media articles were appearing, however, crack cocaine use—never particularly widespread—was on the
decline, how can we explain the dramatic legislative response, which
suggested that crack cocaine abuse was both rampant and on the rise?
Probably the most common explanation provided for the disconnect between the reaction to and the reality of crack cocaine has been
that of race—white Americans were panicking about African Americans, particularly young urban African-American men.74 Crack cocaine use and trade was linked through media articles and legislative
debates to violent offenses, degradation of urban centers, family
breakdown, and a host of other social problems.75 A lack of sympathetic identification on the part of Caucasian legislators and voters
may have facilitated this linkage as well as the decision to deal with
this constellation of perceived problems through incarceration and
criminal control.
Whether or not enforcement of drug laws is racist in design or intent, the argument goes, the War on Drugs has been in operation a
war on African-Americans.76 For many scholars and civil rights lead71. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994)).
72. See, e.g., Troy Duster, Pattern, Purpose, and Race in the Drug War, in CRACK IN
AMERICA, supra note 17, at 265-66 (describing differences in federal sentencing for powder
and crack cocaine offenses and noting that various federal sentencing laws related to crack
cocaine contribute to a pattern of longer sentences for African-American defendants).
73. Watkins & Fullilove, supra note 54, at 385-86.
74. In addition to the works of Reinarman & Levine, collected in CRACK IN AMERICA,
supra note 48, see the sources cited infra notes 76-77.
75. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, The Notorious 100:1 Crack: Powder Disparity—The
Data Tell Us that It Is Time to Restore the Balance, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 87 (2003) (noting that the crack: powder sentencing differences are “particularly distressing because
crack defendants are primarily black and powder defendants are primarily white and Hispanic, so the differential treatment can too easily be seen as a manifestation of racial discrimination”); Duster, supra note 72, at 264-65 (citing statistics to the effect that while in
the early 1990s, African-Americans comprised 15-20% of drug users, in most urban areas,
they comprised half to two-thirds of persons arrested for drug offenses and attributing racial imbalances in arrest and prosecution rates to “the selective aim of the artillery in the
drug war”); Glasser & Siegel, supra note 67, at 241 (arguing that “fears about crack merged
easily with racial fears”); cf. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47
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ers, late twentieth century drug policy was “[t]he [n]ew Jim Crow.”77
Civil rights activists particularly decried the differences in the federal sentencing guidelines for powder cocaine and crack cocaine, depicting this dual sentencing scheme as a transparent attempt to punish
African-American criminality more harshly than its white counterpart.78 (Many scholars concur, arguing that the current racial imbalances in incarceration rates are substantially attributable to efforts to combat crack cocaine.)79
Some people who have looked at the responses of government bodies and the public in general to crack cocaine have theorized that part
of the reaction was not only about race, but about the intersection between race and gender. Prosecutions of drug-using women have primarily been aimed at African-American women,80 although drug use
is fairly level among pregnant women of all races.81 The gender/race
linkage has perhaps reflected a desire to control African-American
women who are considered undesirable mothers and to prevent them
STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995) (arguing that evidence is overwhelming that race is instrumental in explaining crack/powder cocaine disparity and faulting existing equal protection doctrine for not coming to same conclusion).
Some go even further in assessing the relationship between race and the governmental response to crack cocaine. Nkechi Taifa, currently a Senior Policy Analyst at the Open
Society Policy Center, argues that the federal approach to crack cocaine investigation,
prosecution, and sentencing “is not only a direct reflection of the institutionalization of racism in the criminal justice system, but of systematic genocide, generally, against Black
people as well.” Nkechi Taifa, Beyond Institutionalized Racism: The Genocidal Impact of
Executive, Legislative & Judicial Decision-Making in the Crack Cocaine Fiasco, NAT’L B.
ASS’N MAG., Sept./Oct. 1996, at 13, 14-16 (arguing that crack cocaine sentences are not
supported by empirical evidence and denote a “racially discriminatory drug enforcement
policy,” and describing the federal crack: powder cocaine sentencing differences as “apartheid-type”). But see Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1267 (arguing that African Americans are
harmed by under- rather than over-enforcement of drug laws); John P. Walters, Race and
the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 107, 144 (arguing that enforcement of drug laws
has not reflected racism or produced racially disparate results).
77. See, e.g., Symposium, U.S. Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow?, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 303 passim (2001); Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63
ALB. L. REV. 703, 723 (2000).
78. See, e.g., Powder Cocaine, Crack Cocaine, and Race, Hearing Before the U.S. Sent.
Comm’n, (Feb. 25, 2002) (Statement of Wade Henderson, Executive Director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights) (arguing that federal drug policy disproportionately affects African Americans because of the heightened penalties for crack cocaine as compared
to powder cocaine—as well as racism in criminal investigation and prosecution, and calling
for Guidelines changes that would reduce disparities), reprinted in 14 FED. SENT’G REP.
204, 205 (2002).
79. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 76, at 87; Duster, supra note 72, at 265 (noting
that in Virginia, in 1983, 63% of new prison admits for drug offenses were white; by 1989,
34% were white).
80. See Glasser & Siegel, supra note 67, at 242.
81. See Ira J. Chasnoff, Harvey J. Landress, & Mark E. Barrett, The Prevalence of Illicit
Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas
County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1204 (Apr. 26, 1990) (finding that in Pinellas
County, Florida, while among pregnant women screened, 15.4% of white women and 14.1% of
African-American women tested positive for drugs, African-American women were ten times
more likely to be reported for substance abuse); Siegel, supra note 64, at 251.
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from continuing to reproduce.82 For example, critiques of the “Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity” or “Project Prevention” program
(“CRACK”), which offers drug-addicted women two hundred dollars
in exchange for sterilization, have argued that the program is an attempt to regulate “bad” mothers—largely poor, African-American
women.83
Not all critiques of U.S. crack cocaine policy center on race. William Stuntz, for example, has described the response to crack cocaine
in terms of class.84 Poor people are easier to spot using and trading
drugs—they do so in public, on street corners, and in denselypopulated city centers where police may easily patrol, observe, and
make arrests. More affluent citizens can conceal illicit activity with
suburban remoteness, rolling lawns, and spacious homes. Poor people
are reliant on appointed, indigent counsel, while affluent citizens can
hire a choice of counsel and put up greater roadblocks to prosecution.
The cost and effort of pursuing poor people, who are more likely to
use and trade in crack cocaine, versus wealthier people, who might
be more likely to use other drugs, makes the poor a more attractive
target for law enforcement and prosecutors.85
The response to crack cocaine has thus been the subject of numerous academic critiques. At the center of most has been the thesis that
the reaction to crack cocaine, publicly and legislatively, was overreaction fueled by panic and deeply embedded in volatile patterns of race,
class, and gender.
III. METHADEMIC!
Methamphetamine is not a recent drug innovation; the substance
has been around for ninety years and has been the subject of varying
amounts of media coverage and legislative action for some time. Beginning in 2004 and 2005, however, legislators, media outlets, and
private citizens began paying increased attention to methampheta82. See, e.g., Deleso Alford Washington, “Every Shut Eye, Ain’t Sleep”: Exploring the
Impact of Crack Cocaine Sentencing and the Illusion of Reproductive Rights for Black
Women from a Critical Race Feminist Perspective, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
123, 133-36 (2005).
83. See, e.g., Renee Chelian, Remarks on the “CRACK” Program: Coercing Women’s
Reproductive Choices, 5 J.L. SOC’Y. 187, 193-94 (2003) (describing C.R.A.C.K.’s outreach to
various social service providers and agencies and arguing that the program targets poor,
minority women); Sheila C. Cummings, Foreword: Is CRACK the Cure? 5 J. L. SOC’Y 1, 5-6
(2003) (describing the C.R.A.C.K program); Dana Hirschenbaum, Note, When CRACK Is
the Only Choice: The Effect of a Negative Right of Privacy on Drug-Addicted Women, 15
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 327, 327-28 (2000) (noting that advertisements for the C.R.A.C.K.
program are, by design, placed primarily in poor urban neighborhoods).
84. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1795 (1998).
85. See id.; see also Glasser & Siegel, supra note 67, at 235 (noting that, during the
1980s, large-scale, aggressive drug sweeps focused on poor, minority, urban neighborhoods,
“where drug dealing tended to be open and easy to detect”).
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mine as a social problem, and all fifty states adopted new legislation
related to methamphetamine. It is this period which I refer to as a
“methademic,”86 a period of public and political panic about a perceived, raging new epidemic of drug abuse.
In this Part, I provide an overview of methamphetamine’s history
and a synopsis of recent legislative responses to this perceived epidemic of methamphetamine addiction. In Subpart A, I briefly explain
the characteristics of methamphetamine, media coverage of methamphetamine, and trends in methamphetamine use and abuse. In Subpart B, I summarize the legislative response to methamphetamine
from 2004 forward—particularly, the enactment of prevention-based
laws designed to curtail methamphetamine use and production by
discouraging people from experimenting with the drug and curtailing
the availability of the drug’s ingredients.
A. Methamphetamine Use as an “Epidemic”
Methamphetamine, also referred to in its various forms as “ice,”
“crystal,” “crank,” “speed,” and a variety of other slang terms,87 is a
stimulant drug that acts on the central nervous system to produce a
chemical high by stimulating the release of dopamine.88 Depending
on its form, methamphetamine can be snorted, injected, ingested, or
smoked, and the method of use affects the rapidity with which the
body processes the drug and the onset of the user’s high.89 Methamphetamine can be physiologically addictive according to medical definitions of addiction,90 and repeated usage of the drug is associated
with impaired dopamine production and other side effects.91 Me-

86. References to the purported methamphetamine epidemic as a “methademic” have
been fairly frequent. See, e.g., Jim Lynch, County Combats Growing Meth Crisis: Authorities in Pierce County, Wash. Say the Easily Made Drug Poses Crime, Health and Environmental Threats, OREGONIAN, Aug. 20, 2000, at A21.
87. Many articles catalog methamphetamine slang. For one particularly colorful list,
see Douglas Morris, Methamphetamines: Types, Forms, Effects, and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 32 NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW. CHAMPION MAG., Jan. 2009, at 20 (“Methamphetamine is known by a plethora of nicknames including, inter alia, meth, crank, speed,
chicken feed, crystal, go-fast, shabu, glass, ice, strawberry quick, and methlies quick.”).
88. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Methamphetamine: Abuse and Addiction,
2006 NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH REPORT SERIES 3-4.
89. Methamphetamine is produced in two forms—powder and crystal (and is in this
way similar to cocaine). Powdered methamphetamine is generally ingested, injected, or inhaled. Jane Carlisle Maxwell, Methamphetamine: Epidemiological and Research Implications for the Legal Field, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1121, 1121-22 (2006). Crystal forms of methamphetamine are generally either smoked or heated and inhaled. Id.
90. See, e.g., Anna M. Johnson, A Perspective Regarding Treatment for Methamphetamine Addiction, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1435, 1435-36 (2006).
91. For a thorough summary of methamphetamine’s major effects and side effects, see
Avi Brisman, Meth Chic and the Tyranny of the Immediate: Reflections on the CultureDrug/Drug-Crime Relationships, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1273, 1275-83 (2006).
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thamphetamine is classified federally as a Schedule II drug,92 but is
available legally, by prescription, under the trade name Desoxyn or
in generic form.93
Concern about methamphetamine use and addiction also is not
new. Amphetamines, which are chemically similar to methamphetamine,94 historically received rounds of media and legislative attention.95 Domestic methamphetamine “home-cooking” probably had its
origin in California in the 1950s, as Korean War veterans may have
imported methamphetamine production methods when they returned
from service.96 Major media sources covered methamphetamine abuse
by long-haul truckers and motorcycle gangs during the 1970s and
1980s, when articles described the popularity of the drug’s use for
maintaining alertness on overnight drives.97 A smattering of news articles and academic works documented methamphetamine production
and distribution, particularly in the western United States, in the
late 1980s98 and into the 1990s.99 In particular, between 1996 and
1999, a handful of news articles either predicted that a methamphetamine “epidemic” was imminent or described such an epidemic as
having already taken root.100
92. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§801-971 (2006). Methamphetamine was
added to the Act as a Schedule II drug under in 1971. See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Amphetamine, Methamphetamine and Optical Isomers, 36 FED. REG. 12,734 (July
7, 1971).
93. On the legal uses of methamphetamine, see JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 7; U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 88, at 2.
94. Methamphetamine is a “synthetic” drug that draws its active ingredient from its
“parent drug” amphetamine. It is produced by chemically adding a second methyl-group
molecule to an amphetamine compound. On the chemical relationship between methamphetamine and amphetamine, see, for example, Brisman, supra note 91, at 1275-77, 127677 n.5.
95. The major academic work on the history of American use and regulation of amphetamine is GRINSPOON & HEDBLOM, supra note 17, passim.
96. On the early history of methamphetamine production and use, including in particular its substantial use by military personnel during World War II and the Korean War, see,
for example, DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, FORCES OF HABIT: DRUGS AND THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN WORLD 76-84 (2001); M. Douglas Anglin et al., History of the Methamphetamine
Problem, 32 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 137, 137-38 (2000); Brisman, supra note 91, at 1303-04;
see also GRINSPOON & HEDBLOM, supra note 17, at 18-20, 24-25 (discussing amphetamine use
among U.S. soldiers and veterans of World War II and the Korean War, albeit without distinguishing between methamphetamine and other amphetamines).
97. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 7 (describing use of methamphetamine by
long-haul truckers and motorcycle gangs in the 1960, 1970s, and 1980s).
98. See, e.g., Jonathan Beaty, Southern California Tales of the Crank, TIME, Apr. 24,
1989, at 10 available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957521,00.html
(describing use and manufacture in Southern California); Richard Lacayo, The Menace of
Ice, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 28 (describing methamphetamine as Hawaii’s number one
drug and noting that methamphetamine was making “serious inroads” in other states and
that “speed kings” were planning “vast expansions in production”).
99. See, e.g., T. Christian Miller, O.C. Meth Lab Bust Points up Boom in Drug, L.A.
TIMES, July 22, 1993, at 1.
100. See, e.g., Charlie Goodyear, Methamphetamine Abuse Called Epidemic, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON. Apr. 8, 1999, at A15 (describing an existing “epidemic”); Anastasia
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The latest round of press articles describing the menace of methamphetamine surfaced in 2004 and 2005.101 In those two years, major American newspapers and news magazine ran over one hundred
articles discussing and bemoaning the scourge of meth. Accounts continued to portray methamphetamine use as an “epidemic”102 or a
“siege.”103 Coverage was quick to emphasize the prevalence of methamphetamine in rural areas and to draw connections between methamphetamine use and rural poverty.104 (A second strand of coverage
that never gained quite as much traction emphasized the use of methamphetamine by urban, gay men and expressed concern about the
possibility that meth use among gay men might retrigger the AIDS epidemic.105) Media coverage emphasized a variety of problems related to
Toufexis, There Is No Safe Speed: Three Toddlers’ Deaths Spotlight the Nation’s Latest
Drug Epidemic, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, at 37, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,983922,00.html (quoting a Drug Enforcement Administration official
as describing 1996 methamphetamine use as “absolutely epidemic”); Christopher S. Wren,
Sharp Rise in Use of Methamphetamines Generates Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996, at A16
(describing a “startling rise” in methamphetamine use in western states); Walter Kirn, Crank,
TIME, June 22, 1998, at 24, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
0,9263,7601980622,00.html (describing methamphetamine use as “a powdery plague on America’s heartland”).
101. See, e.g., John-Manuel Andriote, Meth Comes out of the Closet, WASH. POST, Nov.
8, 2005, at F1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2005/11/04/AR2005110402178.html (describing signs of increasing concern about methamphetamine); Joyce Pellino Crane, Lowell Police Voice Concern on Methamphetamine
Threat, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2005, at A24 (describing police in several Massachusetts
communities as being concerned, based on recent methamphetamine laboratory discoveries, that methamphetamine, “epidemic” in the Midwest, was establishing a toehold in
Massachusetts); David J. Jefferson et al., America’s Most Dangerous Drug, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 8, 2005, at 41 (offering hyperbolic account of impending crisis); Dirk Johnson, Policing
a Rural Plague, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 2004, at 41 (describing the use of methamphetamine
as “soaring” and small towns as “[f]eeling under siege”); Paul F. Walsh, Jr., “May You Live
in Interesting Times . . .” , 39 PROSECUTOR, Aug. 2005, at 5, available at http://
www.ndaa.org/ndaa/about/president_message_july_august_2005.html (President of National District Attorneys Association describing methamphetamine as “continu[ing] to roar
eastward across our country leaving destruction, pain and new criminal issues for prosecutors to contend with”); United States: Instant Pleasure, Instant Ageing; Methamphetamine,
ECONOMIST, June 18, 2005, at 47 (noting that methamphetamine “is in the eyes of many,
America’s leading drug problem”).
102. E.g., Crane, supra note 101, at A24.
103. E.g., Johnson, supra note 101, at 41.
104. See, e.g., id. (describing methamphetamine as a “rural plague”); Cameron McWhirter
& Jill Young Miller, Meth Stalks Rural Georgia: Cheap, Easily Manufactured Stimulant Is
Countryside’s Fastest-Growing Drug Problem, and Abuse Can Be Deadly, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., June 6, 2004, at C1 (describing linkage between methamphetamine use and rural
poverty); see also Joh, supra note 10, at 180 (identifying the rural white poor as one of the two
groups who the media associated with methamphetamine use during this period).
105. Professor Joh treats this strand of coverage as on par with the depiction of
methamphetamine as a drug of the rural poor. See Joh, supra note 10, at 181-82; see also
id. at 181 n.32 (collecting media sources from this period depicting purported epidemic of
meth use among urban, gay men); David J. Jefferson et. al., Party, Play — And Pay,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2005, at 38 (describing a “Party and Play” phenomenon in which gay
men use methamphetamine prior to having risky sexual relations, and arguing that
methamphetamine use is associated with HIV transmission rates).
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methamphetamine manufacturing and consumption, paying particular
attention to the explosiveness of the ingredients used in manufacturing the drug,106 the alleged horrific effects of the drug on the oral
health of its users,107 and the many ways in which meth endangered
children.108 Advertising campaigns against methamphetamine include
warnings of the environmental hazards posed to innocent bystanders
when local residents manufacture methamphetamine.109
Has this coverage reflected a real, recent epidemic of methamphetamine use? As was the case with crack cocaine, the media coverage has not appeared to accurately depict trends in methamphetamine usage.110 Methamphetamine use does not appear, by credible
measures, to be on an upswing.111 Among teenagers, methamphetamine use has steadily declined over the past five years, and was in
decline during the 2005 uptick in methamphetamine articles.112
106. See, e.g., Arian Campo-Flores, The Fallout: ‘I Felt My Face Just Melting,’
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 2005, at 44.
107. See, e.g., Paul Harris Crossville, Tragic Orphans of U.S. Drugs Epidemic: Crystal
Meth Hits Rural Areas, OBSERVER, Aug. 14, 2005, at 22 (describing “meth mouth”). Whether the effects of “meth mouth” are actually attributable to methamphetamine use quickly
became an object of substantial debate. Cf. Jack Shafer, The Meth-Mouth Myth: Our Latest
Moral Panic, SLATE, Aug. 9, 2005, at A.21, http://www.slate.com/id/2124160 (expressing
skepticism).
108. See, e.g., Crossville, supra note 107, at 22.
109. See, e.g., Steve Suo, Nationwide Ad Campaign Takes Aim at Methamphetamine
Abuse, OREGONIAN, Dec. 3, 2005, at C7 (describing a national anti-methamphetamine
televised commercial campaign by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, including one
dramatization in which a small child is exposed to methamphetamine fumes from a
neighbor’s manufacturing enterprise, and a second dramatization in which a confused nonsmoker reports coughing symptoms to his medical care provider while a narrator intones
that the man’s new home is a former methamphetamine lab).
110. In contrast with earlier drug panics, some media sources openly doubted—and even
directly critiqued—their competitors’ hyperbolic coverage of methamphetamine. In particular,
Slate columnist Jack Shafer has mobilized data to aggressively critique some of the more exaggerated media accounts. See, e.g., Jack Shafer, Meth Madness at Newsweek: This Is Your
Magazine on Drugs, SLATE, Jan. 31, 2007, at 5, http://www.slate.com/id/2123838; Shafer, supra note 107.
111. A 2006 study suggests that approximately 731,000 Americans were using methamphetamine in 2006, a number that was roughly unchanged from four years earlier.
See Joh, supra note 10, at 180 n.24. Quest Diagnostics, the largest administrator of
workplace drug tests in the United States, reported similar overall rates of usage, but also
noted a steeper pattern of decline. See Quest Diagnostics, USE OF METHAMPHETAMINE
AMONG U.S. WORKERS AND JOB APPLICANTS DROPS 22 PERCENT IN 2007 AND COCAINE USE
SLOWS DRAMATICALLY, in DRUG TESTING INDEX, (2008), available at http://
www.questdiagnostics.com/employersolutions/dti/2008_03/dti_index.html (reporting that
positive test results for methamphetamine peaked at 0.33% in 2004 and declined by between 15 and 36 percent each year between 2004 and 2007). Those rates are substantially
lower than the positive test results for marijuana (2.59%) or cocaine (0.70%). See id. As
happened with crack cocaine, to the extent that methamphetamine use was at any point on
an upswing—Quest reports that positive methamphetamine screens increased by some
73% between 2002 and 2004—by the time media and public attention turned to the drug,
usage, never particularly widespread, was on the decline. Id.
112. According to in-school surveys conducted by the University of Michigan’s Monitoring
the Future study and supported by grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the
National Institutes of Health, methamphetamine use among teenagers has dropped fairly
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While words like “epidemic” pepper articles about methamphetamine
use,113 most Americans do not use and have never used methamphetamine,114 and the 2007 usage figures continue to show decline, suggesting that most Americans never will. While methamphetamine
use doubtlessly can be devastating, and while usage rates likely have
increased in particular areas or communities, there is not what
steadily since the survey began tracking self-reported methamphetamine use figures in 1999.
In 1999, 4.5% of eighth graders, 7.3% of tenth graders, and 8.2% of twelfth graders reported
having ever used methamphetamine; the 2005 figures were 3.1%, 4.1%, and 4.5% respectively, and the latest available figures, from 2007, put lifetime usage at 1.8%, 2.8%, and 3.0% respectively. See L.D. Johnson, et al., Overall, Illicit Drug Use by American Teens Continues
Gradual
Decline
in
2007,
Table
1
http://monitoringthefuture.org/data/
07data.html#2007data-drugs. According to usage figures from 2007, more teenagers have
tried marijuana, inhalants, non-LSD hallucinogens, MDMA (“ecstasy”), cocaine, other amphetamines, and tranquilizers. See id. Similarly, teens reporting that they have used methamphetamine at any point within the past year declined (for eighth, tenth, and twelfth graders
respectively) from 3.2%, 4.6%, and 4.7% in 1999, to 1.8%, 2.9%, and 2.5%, respectively, in
2005; the 2007 figures are 1.1, 1.5%, and 1.7%. See id., at Table 2. Self-reported methamphetamine use within the past thirty days follows the same pattern; in 1999, 1.1% of eighth
graders, 1.8% of tenth graders, and 1.7% of twelfth graders reported such recent use; by 2005,
those percentages had declined to 0.7%, 1.1%, and 0.9%, and they stood at 0.6%, 0.4%, and
0.6% in 2007. See id., at Table 3. These survey results are similar to those produced by the
Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS), a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention survey
that includes self-reported youth engagement in various risky behaviors, including drug use;
according to the YRBS, among 9th through 12th graders, the percentage of students who reported that they ever had used methamphetamines showed “no change” between 1999 and
2001 (hovering between 9.1 and 9.8%), and fell to 6.2% by 2005 and 4.4% by 2007. See CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, TRENDS IN THE PREVALENCE OF MARIJUANA, COCAINE, AND OTHER
ILLEGAL
DRUG
USE—NATIONAL
YRBS:
1991-2007,
available
at
http://
www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/yrbs/pdf/us_drug_trend_yrbs.pdf.
113. See supra notes 100-09.
114. As noted above, see supra note 111, the most recent systematic data suggests that
there are less than three-quarters of a million current users of methamphetamine. According to 2006 data from the Department of Health and Human Services’ Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration, as of 2006, there were approximately 731,000
current methamphetamine users in the United States (about 0.3% of the population); about
5.8% of Americans reported that they had tried methamphetamine. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF APPLIED
STUDIES, RESULTS FROM THE 2006 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH:
NATIONAL FINDINGS 18, available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/2k6nsduh/
2k6Results.pdf. The same survey reports that about 5.2 million Americans were, in 2006,
current recreational users of prescription drugs; 2.4 million were current cocaine users;
and 14.8 million were marijuana users. Id. at 16, 18. See also KING, supra note 10, at 4-14
(reviewing several different drug usage studies, including emergency room admissions and
positive drug tests among arrestees, and concluding that methamphetamine is used regularly by a very small percentage of Americans, and that the rate of people using methamphetamine monthly has been stable over the past several years). Despite this data, even
articles in law journals make statements to the effect that methamphetamine “has become
one of the most abused drugs in America.” Lauren Grau, Comment, Cutting off the Building Blocks to Methamphetamine Production: A Global Solution to Methamphetamine
Abuse, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 157, 161 (2007). Methamphetamine use does, however, vary by
location—while positive drug tests among arrestees are fairly constant across jurisdictions,
positive drug tests for methamphetamine specifically vary widely, reflecting provincial differences in drugs of choice. See KING, supra note 10, at 13-14; DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., supra, at 27 (reporting that methamphetamine use was approximately five times
more widespread in the West than in the Northeast).
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would appear to be a large-scale, widespread upswing in methamphetamine use.
While “epidemic” thus appears an inflation of actual usage rates,
the racial depictions of methamphetamine users are more accurate:
most methamphetamine users are Caucasian.115 About half of federal
methamphetamine DEA arrests are of individuals identified as Caucasian; the majority of non-Caucasian methamphetamine DEA arrestees are Latino/Hispanic.116
B. Legislative Responses to Methamphetamine
The central and most pervasive legislative responses to the perceived methamphetamine epidemic have been to constrain the ability
of would-be home manufacturers to obtain necessary production ingredients and to educate the public against methamphetamine use
and production. Recipes for methamphetamine production are readily
available via print media and the internet117 and use ingredients and
hardware that historically have been easy to purchase at neighborhood stores.118 The most important of those ingredients, pseudoephedrine—the active ingredient in certain kinds of cold medications—
has anchored legislative action, as states, followed by Congress, have
sought to limit the ability of prospective manufacturers to access necessary materials as well as to discourage people from becoming new
users or producers of methamphetamine.
In fact, the legislative response to methamphetamine in some areas
preceded the perception of a regional methamphetamine problem.
When, for example, Massachusetts State Senator Harriette L. Chandler, D-Worcester, introduced legislation seeking to restrict public ac115. See, e.g., David E. Smith, Gantt P. Galloway & Richard B. Seymour, Methamphetamine Abuse, Violence and Appropriate Treatment, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 661, 667 (1997)
(providing data).
116. See Mark Motivans, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Stat., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
BULLETIN: FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2005 at 2 (Sept. 2008), available at http://
www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs05.pdf (reporting that of 6,461 methamphetamine
arrests conducted by the DEA in 2005, 3,154 of the arrestees were white; 2,809 Hispanic/Latino; 173 Asian/Pacific Islander; 143 black/African American; and 61 American Indian/Alaskan Native).
117. Debra S. Peterson and R. Michael Jennings, Methamphetamine A Recipe for Disaster, 73 J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Oct. 2004, at 7 (noting that bookstores, internet sites, and even court
decisions provide recipes for manufacturing methamphetamine). For a description of the methamphetamine production process in laymen’s language, see id. at 8,44.
118. Methamphetamine is similar in chemical structure to ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, making it relatively easy to synthesize in home- or vehicle-based “laboratories.” See,
e.g., Samantha S. McKinley & Joseph L. Fink III, “Speed Limits”: States’ Approaches to Regulating Access to Methamphetamine Chemical Precursors with Statutes and Regulations Limiting Pseudoephedrine Availability, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1217, 1220-21 (2006). Recipes generally include cold medication (for the active ingredient, ephedrine or pseudoephedrine), lithium extracted from lithium batteries, ether, and anhydrous ammonia or iodine (depending on the
methamphetamine form produced), as well as other substances such as paint thinner, freon,
drain cleaner, and lye. Id. at 1221-22.
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cess to pseudoephedrine, she did not argue that this restriction was
necessary to combat current methamphetamine production in the
state; rather, she argued that such restrictions were necessary to avoid
developing a methamphetamine problem in the state.119 Similarly, the
Partnership for a Drug Free America justified a major new government-backed public education campaign against methamphetamine
manufacturing, launched in late 2005, as “true prevention” and an attempt to “deal[] with [the drug] before it’s a crisis.”120
The focus on education, treatment, and pseudoephedrine restriction has not been one settled on accidently; legislatures and executives explicitly and intentionally have privileged methamphetaminereduction options rather than focusing on criminal sanctions.121 In
the following Sections, I describe state and federal legislative responses to the perceived epidemic of methamphetamine use and manufacture. While jurisdictions have in some cases increased criminal
penalties—in particular, where legislatures have believed that “innocent” nonusers, particularly children, are endangered—by and large,
legislators have focused on preventative rather than incarcerative
strategies, a response we might not have been conditioned to expect
from the literature surrounding legislative reactions to the crack cocaine “epidemic” in particular.

119. Dan Lamothe, ‘Meth’ Eyed as Latest Menace, REPUBLICAN, Sept. 26, 2005, at A1
(quoting State Senator Chandler as saying, “[w]e’re looking to put [pseudoephedrine] behind the counter because we’re looking to avoid the problem that places like Oregon have
had . . . . Nothing happens across the country that doesn’t eventually happen here”); see also Brian Scheid, Officials on the Watch for Meth in Bucks, INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 7, 2005, at
3B (quoting Chief of County Detectives in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, as saying that methamphetamine could move into his area, and arguing for proactive action because “[i]t’s
perfectly ripe for this problem to get out of hand if we don’t get our hands around it first”);
Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, For Now, Meth’s LI Presence on Fire Island, NEWSDAY, Mar.15,
2004, at A42 (quoting a local Nassau County officer, commenting on crystal methamphetamine, as saying: “It’s virtually nonexistent . . . . You keep hearing it’s going to come, but
it hasn’t hit here yet”).
120. Kenneth C. Crowe II, Ad Campaign Targets Meth Lab Dangers: TV Commercials are
Designed to Shock to Mobilize Communities, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Dec. 13, 2005, at B8.
121. For example, when Congress began considering comprehensive antimethamphetamine legislation in 2006, one of the prominent bills included harsh new mandatory minimum sentences. See Cassidy, supra note 10, at 134. However, after considering
the matter, the House Judiciary Committee voted unanimously to strip them from the bill.
See id.
Some individuals involved in administering the legislative response to methamphetamine have made similar observations. For example, Anna M. Johnson, Director of Operations at a North Dakota recovery center, notes that “[d]uring North Dakota’s Fifty-Ninth
Legislative Assembly in 2005, senators and representatives from across the state voted to
respond to the methamphetamine epidemic with treatment rather than incarceration.”
Johnson, supra note 90, at 1437. As Johnson notes, the relevant bill passed the North Dakota Senate by a 47-0 vote and the North Dakota House by an 88-5 vote (88 yeas, 5 nays, 1
absent). See id., at 1437 n.8.

2010]

METHADEMIC

867

1. Precursor Regulations
The primary way in which legislatures have responded to a perceived methamphetamine epidemic has been to make it more difficult
for prospective methamphetamine manufacturers to obtain essential
production ingredients. Many confused persons first encounter this
central form of legislative response when attempting to self-medicate
cold and allergy symptoms. Puzzled drug store patrons must request
that Sudafed bottles be liberated from locked cabinets and behindcounter stashes; provide identification as they might for alcohol purchase; observe limits on the number of capsules they can purchase;
and submit information to the commercial establishment to permit
either the store or law enforcement officials to track the quantity and
frequency of pseudoephedrine purchases. These changes in commercial practice comport with restrictions that states pioneered and the
United States Patriot Act now essentially requires.
Restrictions on the ability to purchase precursor ingredients for
methamphetamine manufacture are not in themselves new. Western
states began restricting precursor sales in the 1980s,122 and Congress
passed a half-hearted measure that imposed some restrictions in
1996 in response to the first significant round of media stories positing a coming meth “epidemic.”123 However, as described below,124 the
widespread introduction of precursor regulations did not occur until
2004 to2005, when legislatures began to respond to the perceived epidemic of drug use described above.125
Prior to the recent round of relatively uniform restrictions, some
prosecutors attempted to utilize then-existing criminal law to convince
merchants to monitor sales of items associated with methamphetamine manufacturing and to avoid selling items where they might be
used to manufacture meth. Merchants were, for example, prosecuted
under general conspiracy laws for selling items such as cold medication, lighter fluid, matches, and ether in quantities or combinations
that, according to law enforcement officials, put the merchants on notice that a customer intended to use the purchased items to manufac122. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11055(f)(1) (West Supp. 1990); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 37-2707(g)(1) (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.146(2)(h) (Michie Supp.
1989); OR. REV. STAT. §475.940 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37c-3(2)(p)-(q), 58-37c-4
(1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.206 (g)(1) (West. Supp. 1990).
123. See generally Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-237, 110 Stat. 3099 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19, 21, 28, and 42
U.S.C.). As commentators have noted, the 1996 Act was largely ineffective in regulating
precursors as it provided a blanket exception to purchase restrictions for approved overthe-counter cold medications. See, e.g., Jean C. O’Connor, Jamie F. Chriqui & Duane C.
McBride, Developing Lasting Legal Solutions to the Dual Epidemics of Methamphetamine
Production and Use, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1165, 1177 (2006).
124. See infra notes 129-141and accompanying text.
125. See supra Part III.B.
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ture methamphetamine.126 An individual who purchases or attempts to
purchase such items in combinations and quantities that seem suspicious may still be detained by law enforcement officers to investigate
intent to manufacture methamphetamine.127 Some retailers voluntarily moved pseudoephedrine products behind their counters prior to any
specific legislation requiring them to do so.128
The specific set of legal changes described in this Section passed
quickly and without organized opposition. Some drug companies resisted restrictions on purchases and sales by lobbying against legislation,129 although those lobbying efforts proved unsuccessful. Also,
some pharmaceutical manufacturers have replaced the pseudoephedrine in some cold medication products with phenylephrine, an active
ingredient that may not be as effective as a decongestant.130
Within the past few years, virtually all states have passed legislation that in essence formalizes the assumption that purchasing partic126. In one high-profile law enforcement effort in Georgia, “Operation Meth Merchant,” undercover agents went to stores in several counties, told clerks in slang terms that
they planned to “cook” methamphetamine, and purchased combinations of products that,
according to prosecutors, should have put merchants on notice that they were selling items
to be pressed into service for methamphetamine manufacture. Defendants were prosecuted
for violating federal statutes that criminalize (i) selling legal but regulated drugs with reason to believe that the drugs are going to be used to manufacture illegal drugs, see 21
U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (2006), and (ii) selling materials or products with reason to believe that
they will be used to manufacture illegal drugs, see 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(7) (2006). See United
States v. Patel, No. 4:05-CR-27-02, slip. op. at 3-4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.stopoperationmethmerchant.org/pdf/MotionDeniedOrder.pdf. Civil liberties
groups and others criticized the operation for, as they perceived, targeting stores operated by
South Asian immigrant families with limited English skills and a lack of knowledge of manufacturing mechanics and methamphetamine lingo, as well as for using an informant who may
have been unreliable, leading to the arrests of misidentified suspects. See, e.g., Jay Bookman,
Editorial, Meth Sting Pointed at South Asians, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 13, 2005, at A15 (noting that forty-three of forty-nine convenience store clerks and owners arrested in Operation
Meth Merchant were south Asian immigrants); Jay Bookman, War on Crystal Meth Cooks Up
Many Flimsy Charges, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 10, 2005, at A13 (criticizing operation); Feature: Federal Meth Precursor Sting Targeting South Asian Convenience Stores Draws Protests,
ACLU
Intervention,
Jan.
13,
2006,
http://stopthedrugwar.org/
chronicle/418/convenience.shtml (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). A federal district judge dismissed the collected defendant’s claim of selective prosecution. See United States v. Patel, No.
4:05-CR-27-02, slip. op. at 3-4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.stopoperationmethmerchant.org/pdf/MotionDeniedOrder.pdf.
127. See infra Part III.B.
128. See Jim Puzzanghera, Putting Cold, Flu Drugs Out of Reach, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 15, 2005, at 1A (explaining that Walgreens, Target, Wal-Mart, Longs, and
other stores in California put pseudoephedrine-containing products behind the counter in
early 2005, prior to the passage of precursor restrictions requiring them to do so).
129. For example, Pfizer, the manufacturer of Sudafed, and the Consumer Healthcare
Products Association lobbied unsuccessfully against Oklahoma’s Bill 2176, which requires
pseudoephedrine purchasers to present identification and sign a registry. See Mark Schone,
The Epidemic on Aisle 6, LEGAL AFF., Dec. 2004, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/
issues/November-December-2004/feature_schone_novdec04.msp. The Consumer Healthcare
Products Association lobbied with similarly unavailing results in several other states. Id.
130. Robert Cohen, Many Cold Meds Aren’t What They Used to Be, MINNEAPOLIS STARTRIB., Nov. 24, 2006.
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ular items denotes an intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and
in general places the burden on stores to prevent customers from purchasing precursor items.131 Oklahoma created the “model” for this sort
of legislation in 2004, when it passed H.B. 2176.132 Legislators hope
that by choking off ingredient supply lines, particularly the sizable
quantities of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine essential to methamphetamine manufacture, local mom-and-pop methamphetamine producers
will be forced to shut down—positing that when “[y]ou control pseudoephedrine, you control the meth.”133 Restrictions on pseudoephedrine
purchase and possession vary from state to state,134 and while (as discussed below) federal law now provides a floor for precursor purchase
restrictions,135 state laws have the following general characteristics.
First, states limit the amount of pseudoephedrine products a customer may purchase (without prescription) at any given time or location. A customer may purchase a specified quantity of pseudoephedrine products at one store or from several stores within a certain period of time.136 In order to ensure that customers are not assuming
new identities; returning repeatedly to a store or a series of stores in
an attempt to cobble together a number of small purchases (a tactic
known as “smurfing”137); or otherwise attempting to circumvent purchase restrictions, legislation requires stores to demand that customers produce identification at the time of purchase or to sign into a

131. In 2005 alone, thirty-five states passed such laws, generally known as “meth precursor” restrictions, bringing the total number of states with such restrictions well over forty. See Monica Cain & Cretson Dalmadge, The Effects of State-Level Methamphetamine
Precursor Restriction on Drug Laboratory Seizures, 8 REV. BUS. RES. 36, 36 (2007) (summarizing 2006 legislation).
132. See Scott Ehlers, State Legislative Affairs Update, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW.
CHAMPION MAG., Nov. 2005, at 58.
133. Gaylord Shaw, When Meth Hits Home/Oklahoma Trooper’s Routine Check Turns
Fatal, Prompting Focus on a Powerful Drug Gaining Popularity, NEWSDAY, Mar. 15, 2004,
at A6 (quoting an Oklahoma state narcotics bureau official in an article that describes multiple killings that state officials attribute to methamphetamine).
134. For one fairly complete list of state regulations, see DUANE C. MCBRIDE ET AL.,
INSTITUTE FOR PREVENTION OF ADDICTIONS, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE
METHAMPHETAMINE PRECURSOR LAWS AND TRENDS IN SMALL TOXIC LABS (STL) SEIZURES
60-61 (2008), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223467.pdf.
135. See 21 U.S.C. § 830(e)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (imposing restrictions and reporting requirements on retailers who display and sell products identified as potential methamphetamine precursors); see also Patricia Stanley, Comment, The Combat Methamphetamine
Epidemic Act: New Protection or New Intrusion?, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 379, 404-05 (2007)
(summarizing the relevant federal provisions).
136. For a summary of state purchase restrictions that notes some interesting differences between state laws, see O’Connor et al., supra note 123, at 1182-85; see also Stanley,
supra note 135, at 393-94 (noting variations in state laws, in particular between states that
simply limit the amount that can be purchased during a single transaction and states that
limit the total amount that can be purchased within a given time period).
137. See, e.g., Andrew C. Goetz, Note, One Stop, No Stop, Two Stop, Terry Stop: Reasonable Suspicion and Pseudoephedrine Purchases by Suspected Methamphetamine Manufacturers, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1573, 1584 (2007) (explaining the term).
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hard-copy or electronic log book so that purchase amounts and patterns can be tracked.138
Second, state laws place requirements on retailers who vend
products that contain pseudoephedrine. Jurisdictions mandate that
stores monitor pseudoephedrine products, put pseudoephedrine
products under the control of pharmacists, or keep products secured
behind a counter or in a locked case; and report thefts and suspicious
behavior to authorities.139 In this manner, some law enforcement
functions are placed on retailers, who monitor customers and merchandise to ensure compliance with the law.
Third, some states have criminalized possession of particular
amounts of pseudoephedrine or permitted an inference of intent to
manufacture from possession of a specified quantity of pseudoephedrine.140 While it may have always been possible to get a jury instruction to the effect that intent to manufacture methamphetamine can
be inferred from the possession of a certain quantity or combination
of precursor materials, this inference has been formalized by states
into a statutory presumption.141
The efficacy of the relatively new precursor restrictions is debatable. Most law enforcement officials appear to believe that the restrictions have reduced the number of mom-and-pop methamphetamine
labs, and media sources and police departments have reported fewer
methamphetamine laboratory raids in many areas since restrictions
have been put into place.142 Reduced numbers of laboratories detected
138. See O’Connor et al., supra note 123, at 1184-85 (describing a variety of identification and record-keeping requirements imposed by different states). Since 2006, Oregon has
required a prescription for the purchase of products containing pseudoephedrine. See OR.
REV. STAT. §475.950(2) (2008). Oregon Senator Ron Wyden has recently introduced federal
legislation to impose a similar requirement, but the bill has made no significant legislative
progress. See Dan Schiff, Pseudoephedrine Prescription Bill on the Way, OVER THE
COUNTER TODAY (Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.overthecountertoday.com/
2009/02/pseudoephedrine-prescription-bill-on-the-way.html (noting that Senator Wyden
has drafted and was planning on introducing such a ban in “the Meth Lab Elimination Act
of 2009”).
139. For a summary of some such laws, see Stanley, supra note 135, at 395 (discussing
restrictions imposed on retailers in Alabama, Missouri, and Oklahoma).
140. See, e.g., IND. CODE §35-48-4-14.5 (2006) (classifying possession of more than ten
grams of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine as a Class D felony); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §780.113.1
(2004) (criminalizing possession of any amount of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine if—but only if—the state can establish an intent to manufacture or distribute methamphetamine);
S.C. CODE ANN. §44-53-375(E)(1) (2005) (criminalizing the possession of more than twelve
grams of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine).
141. See, e.g., MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-29-313(2)(c)(ii) (2005) (“[P]ossession of one or
more products containing more than twenty-four (24) grams of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine shall constitute a rebuttable presumption of intent to use the product as a precursor
to methamphetamine or another controlled substance.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §2-332(B)
(2004) (creating a rebuttable presumption that possession of more than nine grams of
pseudoephedrine evinces an intent to produce methamphetamine).
142. See, e.g., Paul Bird, 3 Stores Cited in Meth Checks, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 17,
2005, at 1S (reporting that, as of December of 2005, state police had responded to 941 calls
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can, however, reflect shifting law enforcement priorities or changing
manufacturing strategies. Law enforcement officers might have other
local crises, such as the contemporaneous uptick in violent crime,143
that shift their attention away from methamphetamine production;
they might rely on precursor restrictions in part to reduce their need to
actively work to detect methamphetamine laboratories; mom–and-pop
producers might shift locations in order to be less detectable (sites that
are more rural, more professional “superlabs,” or mobile such as automobile trunks). Also, as discussed below, reducing local production
may or may not reduce local methamphetamine use, although it certainly would reduce the number of persons in the United States exposed to toxic and volatile methamphetamine production chemicals.
State precursor restrictions of course leave several methods of
pseudoephedrine procurement open for the enterprising methamphetamine manufacturer. Not all jurisdictions passed precursor restrictions in the circa-2004 era, and options such as mail-order companies
were not covered by state precursor statutes. In 2006, Congress
stepped in to close some of these loopholes and establish national
standards, adopting the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act as
part and parcel of a larger bill expanding and reauthorizing the Patriot Act.144 The Methamphetamine Act created nationwide pseudoephedrine restrictions that largely mirrored the restrictions recently
put into place in most states and restricted the international and
mail-order sale of pseudoephedrine.145
about methamphetamine labs, compared to 1061 at the same point the year prior, before precursor restrictions were enacted); Vic Ryckaert, Meth Makers Outside U.S. Help Fill Void,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 15, 2005, at 4A (quoting John P. Walters, Director of the White
House Office of National Drug Control Policy, as saying that all Midwestern states had seen
declines in home methamphetamine manufacturing since precursor restrictions were
enacted); Michael A. Lindenberger, Law May Be Cutting Number of Meth Labs, (Louisville)
COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 4, 2005, at A1 (officials in Kentucky credit precursor restrictions
with reducing methamphetamine laboratory seizures). But see Matthew Hathaway, New Law
Isn’t Reducing Meth Lab Seizures, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 2005, at C5 (Jefferson
County, Missouri drug task force members did not observe a drop in methamphetamine lab
raids in the period following the implementation of precursor regulations in Missouri; according to one official: “After the law went into effect, the (meth) cooks were confused for a few
weeks . . . but after that it was back to the same-old, same-old”).
Efforts to study the impact of such laws empirically—rather than anecdotally—are
still in their infancy. For some of the early efforts in this vein, see, for example, MCBRIDE
ET AL., supra note 134; Cain & Dalmadge, supra note 131.
143. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Violent Crime, a Sticky Issue for White House, Shows Steeper
Rise, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2007, at A7 (noting that, after a long decline, violent crime
rates rose in 2006 and rose more steeply in 2005).
144. Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat.
192 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
145. For the core restrictions adopted by the Act, see 21 U.S.C. § 830(e)(1)(A)(i) (imposing restrictions and reporting requirements on retailers who display and sell products
identified as potential methamphetamine precursors and on the mail order purchase of
such products). For an effective summary of the new federal provisions, see Stanley, supra
note 135, at 404-05. Congress expressly indicated that the new federal restrictions were

872

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:841

2. Methamphetamine Registries
Some states have created methamphetamine registries, similar to
sex offender registries, to permit private citizens to track persons convicted of methamphetamine offenses. Tennessee pioneered the methamphetamine registry in 2005, providing public access to a web site
that offers the names, dates of birth, offense category, and date of conviction for persons convicted of methamphetamine manufacturing offenses.146 Legislatures passed bills creating similar registries in several
other states.147 These registries in general are less user-friendly and
provide far less personal information than do sex offender registries.148
Registries are not costless—they require administration and updates—
but they are not as costly as continued incarceration.

meant only as a floor and were not meant to preempt more stringent state restrictions. See
Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act §711(g), 120 Stat. at 263 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§802 note).
146. See Tennessee Meth Offender Database, http://www.tennesseeanytime.org/methorapp/search.jsp (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
147. See, e.g., Illinois Methamphetamine Manufacture Registry, http://www.isp.state.il.us/
meth/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2010); Minnesota Methamphetamine Offender Registry,
https://mor.state.mn.us/OffenderSearch.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2010); Sexual or Violent Offender Registry, MT Dep’t of Justice, http://www.doj.mt.gov/svor/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
148. National guidelines for sex offender registries provide minimum standards for
state sex offender registries. According to these minimum standards, states should post to
websites fairly comprehensive information about sex offenders—their names, addresses,
vehicle descriptions and license plate numbers, physical descriptions and current photographs of registered persons, and the sex offenses for which the person has been convicted.
DEP’T OF JUST., THE NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND
NOTIFICATION 33-34 (2008).
When Oklahoma’s state legislature considered legislation to create a registry, Speaker Todd Hiett, who introduced the bill, argued that “Oklahomans have the right to know if
a meth lab could be in their own neighborhood or community,” while Representative John
Nance, who carried the bill, offered that the registry would “be a useful tool to families as
they look to buy a home. You need to be able to check out all aspects of that home’s history,
including whether there has been a meth lab close by.” Press Release, Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives Todd Hiett (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http:
/www.okhouse.gov/OkhouseMedia/pressroom.aspx?NewsID=512. The focus was on protecting property values and avoiding nuisances, not on stigmatizing offenders. Even still, Oklahoma never adopted a registry, and most of the established registries have been even less
useful. See infra notes 149-150.
The Illinois registry requires a last name to be submitted in order to search for a
convicted person; unlike sex offender registries, a private citizen accessing the registry
cannot, for example, generate a neighborhood map showing where persons convicted of methamphetamine offenses reside. The publicly-accessed record provides the convicted person’s full name, date of birth, and offense of conviction; no photograph or address may be
publicly accessed. See Illinois Methamphetamine Registry, supra note 147. In contrast, the
Illinois sex offender registry, available at http://www.isp.state.il.us/sor/, permits the general public to access lists of sex offenders by city and zip code; to, in addition to viewing dates
of birth and offenses of conviction, access maps of sex offender residence locations; and to
view photographs, full physical descriptions, specific offense details, and complete addresses of registered sex offenders. Other states with methamphetamine registries similarly provide less information and less ease of access than offered through sex offender registries. Compare Tennessee’s methamphetamine registry, supra note 146, which permits
citizens to search for persons convicted of methamphetamine manufacturing offenses by
county or by last name with a first initial, and provides the name, birth date, offense title,
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This methamphetamine registration trend never took root in most
states, however. While a handful of states ultimately passed legislation
creating registries, most states never formally considered methamphetamine registries as a strategy for reducing methamphetamine production, and not all jurisdictions that have considered methamphetamine
registries actually created them.149 In 2006, for example, Georgia, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Washington State all considered legislation to
create registries but ultimately declined to do so.150
The story of state legislative dalliance with methamphetamine registries is a telling allegory. Legislators looking for ways to crack
down on methamphetamine floated proposals modeled on earlier gettough-on-crime strategies. Their bills were quickly reshaped to be
less punitive and more public health oriented than the earlier legislation. Even then, when the costs of the programs became apparent
and were weighed against their limited benefits, most such proposals
quietly died on the vine.
3. Property Regulations
The methamphetamine-producing methods described above carry,
in addition to immediate risks to producers,151 longer-term problems
of contamination and waste.152 Methamphetamine manufacture genand date of conviction, with Tennessee’s sex offender registry, available at
http://www.ticic.state.tn.us/sorinternet/sosearch.aspx, which also permits searches by last
name, city, and zip code, and which provides a photograph, address, and registration status
information for listed persons. Minnesota’s methamphetamine registry permits searches by
last name or by county. See Minnesota Methamphetamine Registry, supra note 147. Registry records include the convicted person’s full name, date of birth, and registry-triggering
offense, and provide a link to the person’s publicly accessible criminal history, if desired.
The registry does not provide a photo, address, or further physical or biographical description. In contrast, the state’s sex offender registry permits searches by county, city, zip code,
or name, and provides a photograph, physical description, address, and specific offense details for the registrant.
149. For examples of bills introduced with great fanfare that were never adopted, see Ga.
H. B. 793, (2006), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2007_08/fulltext/hb793.htm.;
Okla. H. B. 3121, (2008), available at http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/2007-08bills/HB/
HB3121_hflr.rtf; W. Va. H. B. 4525, (2006), available at http://www.legis.state.wv.us/
bill_status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=hb4525%20intr.htm&yr=2010&sesstype=RS&i=4525.
150. For national coverage of Georgia’s then-pending legislation, see Kari Huus, Click
Here for Drug Offenders: Internet Listings Have Popular Appeal, But do they Really Protect the Public? , MSNBC, (Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15971396/. Press
coverage throughout 2006 identified Oklahoma, Washington, and West Virginia, as other
states considering the adoption of a registry. See, e.g., id. As of August 2008, none of those
states had adopted a meth registry. See Jeff Lambert, Tennessee’s Meth Offender Registry
Copied and Reviled, TIMES-NEWS, Aug. 24, 2008, http://www.timesnews.net/
article.php?id=9007847 (reporting that only Tennessee, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, and
Kansas had established methamphetamine registries).
151. For reports of methamphetamine laboratory explosions, see for example, Man Injured in Arnold Meth Lab Explosion, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 4, 2008; Deputies
Blame Explosion on Meth Lab, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 19, 2006, at G2.
152. See, e.g., McKinley & Fink, supra note 118, at 1223 (describing the environmental
concerns arising from methamphetamine manufacture). News coverage of methampheta-
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erates hazardous byproducts, including chemicals that do not easily
degrade. Those chemicals can contaminate the property where the
methamphetamine was produced, groundwater and soil in surrounding areas, and any other property or water supply where byproducts
are dumped. Future property occupants face contamination hazards
and possible health complications from exposure to toxins. These
problems are neither new nor newly identified.
These concerns about the environmental consequences of methamphetamine have spurred diverse policy responses and proposals.
The Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act requires the United
States Transportation Department and the Environmental Protection Agency to begin tracking and reporting on some chemicals that
are byproducts of methamphetamine production.154 Some states have
adopted legislation putting notice and cleanup burdens on people
seeking to transfer property, to ensure that unwary purchasers are
not exposed to toxins.155 Some state and federal programs offer to pay
some or all of the costs of cleaning up the toxic byproducts of methamphetamine when they are found on the property of innocent individuals.156 Advertising campaigns against methamphetamine have
prominently incorporated warnings about the environmental hazards
posed to innocent bystanders when local residents manufacture methamphetamine.157 Some commentators have advocated the aggres153

mine production has routinely made reference to the environmental hazards posed by
home methamphetamine laboratories. See, e.g., Hal Marcovitz, Congressmen Call for Limits on Sales of Cold Medication; Bill Aimed at Stopping Crystal Meth Operators, Two Tell
Bucks County, THE MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.) , Oct. 7, 2005, at B1 (describing how
methamphetamine lab operators dump hazardous waste into woods and streams). For recent academic discussion of environmental issues raised by methamphetamine production,
see O’Connor et al., supra note 123, at 1172-73, 1187. See generally Smith, Cooking Up Solutions, supra note 10; Cheri-Lynn Wortham, Comment, Methamphetamine and Cocaine
Manufacturing Effects on the Environment and Agriculture, 17 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L.
REV. 343 (2008).
153. Several student notes on the environmental problems associated with
methamphetamine labs appeared prior to the recent flurry of news articles about
methamphetamine. See, e.g., Tamara B. Maher, Note, Legal Liabilities Faced by Owners of
Property Contaminated by Clandestine Methamphetamine Laboratories: The Oregon
Approach, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 325 (1991); Anna S. Vogt, Comment, The Mess Left
Behind: Regulating the Cleanup of Former Methamphetamine Laboratories, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 251 (2001). States had also previously enacted statutes for the purpose of addressing
environmental hazards associated specifically with methamphetamine production. See,
e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 453.855 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 64.44.005 (2009). These statutes
include provisions that require property owners to warn potential purchasers about
contamination. See, e.g.., OR. REV. STAT. § 105.464(I)(8)(F)&(H)(2007); WASH REV. CODE §
64.06.020 (2009).
154. See Jeff Wyble, Methamphetamine—The New Epidemic, 11 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. &
L. 115, 140 (2007) (collecting and describing scattered provisions of the Act that impose
new environmental reporting requirements).
155. See O’Connor et al., supra note 123, at 1187 (describing adoption of such reforms
in Colorado and South Dakota).
156. See Wortham, supra note 152, at 349-53 (describing some such programs).
157. See, e.g., Suo, supra note 109, at C7.
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sive use of nuisance and zoning laws to regulate, eliminate, and sanction methamphetamine laboratories.158
4. Child-Protective Measures
Legislative responses to methamphetamine have often focused—
both rhetorically and substantively—on the dangers that the manufacture and use of the drug pose to children.159 Many such efforts
have been educative or ameliorative. For example, the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act included a twenty million dollar grant
program to assist states in establishing programs to assist children
exposed to methamphetamine.160 Sponsors of a similar House provision emphasized the children’s innocence; as Representative Zach
Wamp stated, “Through no fault of their own these children have
been placed in an unconscionable position because their parents or
guardians surrendered their wills to an incredibly addictive drug,”
describing affected children as “orphans of the despicable meth
trade.”161 Public education campaigns have, likewise, focused on dangers to children.162
As might be expected when children are involved, initiatives in
this area have also, at times, been punitive. While it is possible that
a variety of methamphetamine offenses might expose a parent or
guardian to traditional child neglect or abuse charges, many states
have enacted specific “child abuse by methamphetamine” statues
that make it an offense to expose a child or other helpless dependant
to the production of methamphetamine or have passed sentence enhancement provisions that increase the punishment of those convicted of methamphetamine manufacturing if children are present
during the manufacturing of the drug.163 These statutes seek to limit
the extent to which “innocents” in custodial care are exposed to toxic
chemicals and possible explosions and fires through punishing parents and caregivers who facilitate that exposure.
158. See, e.g., Smith, America’s Methamphetamine Crisis, supra note 10, at 624-34 (advocating aggressive use of nuisance laws).
159. Expressions of particular concern for children “victimized” by methamphetamine
are a familiar trope in the academic literature, see, e.g., Smith, America’s Methamphetamine Crisis, supra note 10, at 609 (describing children as one of “two classes of individuals”
who “most consistently suffer from the harms of methamphetamine production”); in media
coverage, see, e.g., Joh, supra note 10, at 183 (reviewing media coverage of the so-called
meth “epidemic” and concluding that “the methamphetamine addict was construed as an
immoral or amoral monster, whose addiction wreaked havoc upon children”); and in government reports, see, e.g., KAREN SWETLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN AT
CLANDESTINE METHAMPHETAMINE LABS: HELPING METH’S YOUNGEST VICTIMS (2003).
160. Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 755; see
also Wyble, supra note 153, at 141 (explaining the intended uses of this grant money).
161. Press Release, Rep. Jim Cooper, Meth-Endangered Children to Benefit from New
Grant Program, U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec. 14, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 20389395.
162. See, e.g., Suo, supra note 109, at C7 (describing one such commercial).
163. For a discussion of these developments, see infra Part III.B.
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5. Methamphetamine Prisons
During the round of concern about crack-cocaine offenses, many
people were sent to prison; the prisons were general prisons with a
variety of offender types that may or may not have had specific substance abuse treatment or other rehabilitative programs available.
In contrast, in response to methamphetamine, Montana and Illinois have created prisons specifically designed to house persons who
have been convicted of offenses and are addicted to methamphetamine,164 while several other states have set up special units within
other prisons dedicated to meth-addicted prisoners.165 While obviously incarcerative, these prisons reflect a more nuanced—and more
ambivalent—response to the problems raised by substance abuse.
Certainly, prisons specially dedicated to the rehabilitative needs of a
specific class of substance abusers were not part of prior legislative
and executive responses to perceived drug epidemics.
6. Drug Treatment Courts
In confronting the problems posed by methamphetamine, states
have increasingly utilized specialized drug courts to deal with a significant segment of those charged with violating criminal drug statutes. Many states have made drug courts a centerpiece of their antimethamphetamine efforts.166 For example, Montana—a state that
considers itself one of the hardest-hit regions of the country in terms
of its methamphetamine problem—has established family drug court
programs in several jurisdictions, serving both adults and juveniles.167 The federal government has also endorsed the strategy, making over $70 million available annually to states to implement and
maintain such courts.168
164. See Catharine Skipp & Arian Campo-Flores, Addiction: A “Meth Prison” Movement, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 24, 2006 (describing the new prisons in those states).
165. See id. (describing experiences in other states, notably Indiana); see also NORTH
DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, METH PRISONS IN OTHER STATES (2006) (document prepared for North Dakota Assembly Budget Committee on Government Services), available
at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-2005/docs/pdf/79288.pdf (evaluating success of
“meth prisons” in Illinois, Indiana, and Montana in response to proposal for similar prison
in North Dakota).
166. See, e.g., C. WEST HUDDLESTON, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG COURTS: AN
EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR COMMUNITIES FACING METHAMPHETAMINE (2005), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/MethDrugCourts.pdf (discussing successful drug court
programs in California, Utah, and Washington State); Melody Finnemore, Juggling Act:
Rapidly Changing Judiciary Requires Judges to Take on More Complex Roles, 66 OR. ST. B
BUL., Dec. 2005, at 17, 17 (discussing use of drug courts to combat methamphetamine in
Oregon and crucial role of judges in such courts); Ed Kemmick, Drug Treatment Court: A
Glimmer of Hope in the Fight Against Meth, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 2005 (discussing
Montana’s commitment to utilizing drug courts to combat its meth problem).
167. See Kemmick, supra note 166 (describing program).
168. Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 751-54
(2006). The federal commitment to drug courts was not unconditional; in order to obtain
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Drug courts generally provide alternatives to incarceration for participating defendants.169 Defendants whose offenses are considered
linked to drug addiction—whether or not the offense charged is a drug
offense—may be identified by judges, service personnel, prosecutors, or
defense attorneys as persons who would benefit from substance abuse
treatment, and who should avoid incarceration and/or conviction if
they successfully complete treatment. These programs usually follow
one of two formats: either the defendant enters the alternative program after arrest, but prior to conviction,170 or, alternatively, the defendant may plead guilty and have an incarcerative sentence suspended pending completion of the drug court program.171 Completion of
the program might lead to no conviction, the dismissal of a conviction,
or a conviction that does not lead to a jail or prison sentence.172
Drug courts usually require the participant to complete drug
abuse treatment, maintain employment or student status, be closely
supervised by program personnel, and receive other services, such as
family or mental health services, that the court might consider necessary.173 While drug courts are superficially similar to probation in
that defendants are supervised and a failure to comply with the program’s terms may lead to consequences for the defendant, the level of
supervision provided to defendants is generally more intensive (defendants often appear in front of judges for status reports, and may
attend several meetings with treatment providers and other rehabi-

these funds states were required to design their drug courts to include mandatory drug
testing and to impose graduated sanctions for failures to pass such test. See id. at §753; cf.
HUDDLESTON, supra note 166 (mentioning a federal report encouraging states to adopt
drug courts).
169. On drug courts generally, see Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology,
20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.417, 417-25 (2009) (summarizing history, theory, and functions of
modern drug courts).
170. See, e.g., California Courts, Drug Court, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/
collab/drug.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2010) (“A preplea diversion program allows criminal
proceedings to be suspended while the defendant participates in a program involving counseling, drug testing, education, or other requirements. If the defendant successfully completes the program, the criminal charges are dismissed.”). In some such systems, defendants may be required to sign confessions before entering the drug court program, so that,
should they not successfully complete the program, the prosecutor’s burden of proof at trial
will be easy to meet.
171. See, e.g., Felony Drug Court: Statement from Judge Thomas A. Teodosio, http://
www.summitcpcourt.net/fdc.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010) (noting that the drug courts
in Summit County, Ohio “will be based upon a post-adjudication model”).
172. For comparison of the different consequences of completing and failing to complete
different kinds of drug court programs, see, for example, JAMES L. NOLAN, REINVENTING
JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 41 (2001); Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora &
Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First Century: The Evolution of
the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 717, 725-26, 750 (2008).
173. See generally, e.g., Hora & Stalcup, supra note 172, at 725-27 (describing normal
operation of drug courts).
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litative personnel each week), and intermittent noncompliance, such
as an isolated positive drug test, generally is tolerated.174
To some extent, the willingness of states to experiment with drug
courts as a mechanism for dealing with methamphetamine users
(and the federal government’s encouragement of this experimentation) may reflect a judgment that methamphetamine use presents a
different set of problems—or attracts a different set of users—than
other illegal drugs.175 However, drug treatment courts have existed
for two decades now and have generally become more popular over
the last few years.176 To the extent that methamphetamine users
charged with criminal offenses are being diverted into specialized
drug treatment courts, it is unclear whether they are benefiting from
a special solicitude for meth users or from a general national trend.177
7. Educational Programs
Both state and federal drug education programs, as well as campaigns funded by nonprofit organizations, have created specific antimethamphetamine resources, including television and print advertisements as well as school-based workshops.178 The educational
campaigns have varied in tone and focus; some show innocent children exposed to methamphetamine production by parents or neighbors; some show ravaged producers frantically cooking methamphetamine; most focus on the potentially debilitating physical and
oral health consequences of repeated methamphetamine use.179 One
174. See id.
175. The question of whether our ambivalent policy response to methamphetamine reflects factors unique to methamphetamine or signals a more general softening of American
drug policy is treated extensively infra Part V.
176. See Miller, supra note 169, at 420 (noting creation of first modern drug court in
1989); id. at 417 (“Perhaps the most important judicial response to the War on Drugs has
been the creation of specialty ‘drug courts’ designed to ameliorate the impact of drug sentencing policy on individual drug users.”). One incomplete list of drug court programs lists
programs in 43 states. See National Center for State Courts, Specialty Courts: Drug
Courts: Drug Courts, Drug Indicators, and Drug Court Programs: State Links, http://
www.ncsconline.org/wc/CourTopics/StateLinks.asp?id=24&topic=DrugCt (last visited Aug.
27, 2010).
177. Moreover, there are reasons to question whether diversion into a specialized drug
court program is an unmitigated benefit for a criminal defendant. I explore these issues in
a work in progress entitled “Thinking Outside the Cell: Criminal Justice Policy in a PostMass Incarceration World.” See also Miller, supra note 169 (criticizing aspects of contemporary drug courts as well).
178. One of the most aggressive state-level programs has been the Montana Meth
Project. For coverage of the Project and its advertising campaign, see, for example, Thomas
W. Seibel & Steven A. Mange, The Montana Meth Project: “Unselling” a Dangerous Drug,
20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 405 (2009); Kate Zernike, With Scenes of Blood and Pain, Ads
Battle Methamphetamine in Montana, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006. The Project’s website,
which includes many of the pictures and other material it uses to attempt to influence
teens not to try meth, is available at http://www.montanameth.org/.
179. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 10, at 182; Suo, supra note 109, at C7; Zernike, supra
note 178. For one media expert’s compilation of the forty most effective anti-meth ads (in-
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common tactic of such campaigns is to offer “before” and “after” photographs of meth users.180
Other advertisements specifically target people already using methamphetamine. Here, the language and the imagery are less catastrophic; the pathos is laced with hope. In September of 2008, for example, the Office of National Drug Control Policy submitted an advertisement entitled “Rebuild After Meth.” Under a photograph of a
smiling woman and child, the advertisement trumpets rising treatment and falling usage numbers and focuses on a story to be associated with the photograph:
Consider Teresa. She is a mother, Girl Scout volunteer, and website
developer. Her life took a sharp turn when she started using meth to
lose weight. Her story went from bad to worse as she abandoned her
family, including her 4-year-old daughter, for nearly a year in the
search for her next high. She eventually entered a treatment program and made a commitment to conquer her addiction. Today, she
is drug-free and a leader in anti-meth efforts in her community.
There are thousands of people like Teresa out there, showing individuals and communities what they need to know.181

IV. MAKE NEW DRUG LAWS, BUT KEEP THE OLD
Missing among these various legislative responses to methamphetamine is a dramatic increase in penalties for possession, manufacture, trafficking, and sale. Some legislatures have indeed increased penalties for various methamphetamine offenses in the same
way that we saw penalties increase for crack cocaine in the late
1980s,182 but, as discussed above, most legislatures have focused
more on prevention, education, and treatment than on increased incarceration.183 Nevertheless, there are some familiar themes in the
response to methamphetamine by legislatures, courts, and law enforcement officials. In particular, courts have used methamphetacluding both still images and videos), see 40+ Most Powerful Anti-Meth Advertisements,
http://elitebydesign.com/anti-meth-ads/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
180. The source for most such photographs is the “Faces of Meth” program administered by the Multnomah (Portland), Oregon County Sheriff’s Department. The photographs, which originally gained prominence as accompaniments to the hyperbolic methamphetamine stories THE OREGONIAN ran in 2004 and 2005, are most easily accessed through
the Partnership for a Drug Free America’s website at http://www.drugfree.org/
Portal/DrugIssue/MethResources/faces/index.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010); see also Lisa
Demer, Meth Ills Expand in Alaska, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 2005 (noting that
the United States Attorney’s office in Alaska distributes before-and-after photos of methamphetamine users from the same series).
181. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, REBUILD AFTER METH (undated), available
at http://www.theantidrug.com/openletter/Meth-Rebuild.pdf.
182. See, e.g., Act of May 21, 2004, ch. 845, §§2-3, 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1922, 1923 (codified at TENN. CODE. ANN. §39-17-417 (Supp. 2005)) (lowering the triggering quantity of
methamphetamine for certain sentences from 100 and 1000 grams to 26 and 300 grams).
183. See supra Part III.B.

880

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:841

mine cases to carve out exceptions to Fourth Amendment protections,
and legislatures and prosecutors have sought to protect fetuses and
children from the effects of parental drug use, production, and sale.
A. Familiar Fourth Amendment Developments
A familiar narrative of drugs and the Fourth Amendment describes the expansion of exceptions to Fourth Amendment limitations
on searches and seizures due to the perceived need to police the use,
manufacture, and sale of drugs.184 Based on the nature of drugs
themselves—portable, fungible, and easy to conceal—courts have
gifted law enforcement officers with the ability to search more intrusively and thoroughly than prior doctrine might have suggested.185
Courts have used the ease of illicit drug disposal, as well as the violence associated with drug sales, to support findings of exigent circumstances that permit officers to dispense with obtaining warrants
and, when they do obtain warrants, knocking and announcing their
presence when serving warrants they do obtain.186
The volatility of the chemicals used to produce methamphetamine
has similarly provided a foundation for permitting officers to search
without obtaining warrants. Officers generally establish probable
cause in suspected methamphetamine lab cases by identifying by
smell chemicals associated with methamphetamine production187 or
184. See, e.g., Glasser & Siegel, supra note 67, at 243. Graham Boyd, Director of the
American Civil Liberties Union’s Drug Policy Litigation Project, argues that “the court cases that have most destroyed the Bill of Rights, methodically abridging freedom of religion,
freedom of speech, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and property rights,
have all concerned drugs.” Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL.
L. REV. 839, 840 (2002). In the context of the Fourth Amendment, Boyd argues that the expansion of exceptions based on the War on Drugs is inevitable, as drug offenses lack complaining witnesses, meaning that police need to rely on informants, wiretapping, undercover operations, wiretapping, and other practices that implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 842.
185. A 2002 Villanova Law Review symposium provided some of the nation’s leading
critics of current Fourth Amendment doctrine with an opportunity to explore the connections between drug policy and the decline of Fourth Amendment protections. For some of
the most powerful critiques, see Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment:
A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851
(2002); Kevin R. Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement: Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of Law,
47 VILL. L. REV. 897 (2002); Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753 (2002);
David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search Any Car
at Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815 (2002). See also Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of
War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1993); David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237; Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the
Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987).
186. On the various justifications offered for loosening Fourth Amendment protections
in the drug context, see Luna, supra note 185, at 765-77.
187. A long line of recent Eighth Circuit cases find that both probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry are established based on the smell of
methamphetamine manufacture and little or nothing else. See, e.g., United States v.
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by observing equipment and materials associated with methamphetamine manufacture.188 Courts reason that, where an officer has
probable cause to believe that an operational methamphetamine laboratory exists in a location, exigent circumstances permit the officer
warrantless entry in order to protect residents, neighbors, and the officers themselves from the possibility that the methamphetamine lab
might at any moment explode.189
Finally, as methamphetamine manufacturers have experimented
with work-around strategies to avoid restrictions on pseudoephedrine
purchases, courts have held that purchasing patterns can also provide reasonable suspicion to detain suspected producers.190 Shopping
companions who separately purchase pseudoephedrine may provide
reasonable suspicion to support a stop.191 Purchasing the maximum
permitted amount of pseudoephedrine at several stores in succession
may also provide reasonable suspicion to effectuate a stop.192 As discussed above, a store clerk or operator who permits a person to make
such purchases, aside from breaking precursor sales restrictions
laws, may be providing investigating officers with reasonable suspi-

Clarke, 564 F.3d 949, 959 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734 (8th
Cir. 2002).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2003).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 564 F.3d at 959; Williams v. State, 995 So. 2d
915, 920-221 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 273 (Iowa 2006);
United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d at 734; United States v. Wilson, 865 F.2d 215, 217 (9th
Cir. 1989). In Williams, the officers offered memorable testimony explaining their reasons
for proceeding without a warrant. 995 So. 2d at 917 (reporting that officers testified “we’ve
been almost blew up in meth labs before”). But see State v. Moore, 183 P.3d 158, 161-162
(N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming district court’s finding that exigent circumstances did not
justify officer’s warrantless entry into home; while an operational methamphetamine laboratory might provide an exigent circumstance supporting warrantless entry, the police
did not “have knowledge of specific, articulable facts that demonstrate that immediate action is necessary”).
190. See generally Andrew C. Goetz, Note, One Stop, No Stop, Two Stop, Terry Stop:
Reasonable Suspicion and Pseudoephedrine Purchases by Suspected Methamphetamine
Manufacturers, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1573 (2007).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443, 448 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding a
finding of reasonable suspicion where two customers picked up pseudoephedrine products
together, purchased them from separate cashiers, consolidated the purchases in the parking lot, and had also purchased a lithium battery that might be used in methamphetamine
manufacture); State v. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d 157 (Iowa 2003) (finding police had sufficient
suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle when the defendant and a woman entered a Target
store together but then separated and bought several boxes of cold medication containing
pseudoephedrine at separate cash registers, before driving to a Walmart). But see State v.
Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. 2004) (finding, on similar facts, that police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Thurston, No. S1-4.02 CR 494 CDP DDN, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14954, at *8-10 (E.D. Mo. May 14, 2003) (finding that police had reasonable
suspicion to perform a Terry stop where customer purchased two boxes of pseudoephedrine
products at a Target, proceeded to a Walgreens, and purchased two additional boxes of
pseudoephedrine).
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cion or probable cause to believe that they are conspiring with or are
an accessory to the manufacture of methamphetamine.193
B. “But What About the Children?”
A second similarity in the criminal sanctions response to methamphetamine has been the focus on the effects of exposure to drug
activity on children and the attempts of legislatures, courts, and
prosecutors to devise ways in which criminal sanctions might curtail
the effects of drug manufacture and use on minors. The exposure of
children to methamphetamine itself can support an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.194
While the legislative response to methamphetamine generally has
not included radically increased sanctions for offenses or wholesale
creation of new crimes, one of the exceptions to this observation is in
the area of child protection. Legislatures have appended methamphetamine exposure to existing child abuse and neglect offenses or
created new “child abuse by methamphetamine exposure” statutes;195
created special felonies criminalizing the manufacture of methamphetamine in the presence of a child or dependant adult;196 and increased penalties for existing methamphetamine offenses when
children are present or involved.197 In states with more general child
193. See, e.g., supra note 126 (discussing one such incident).
194. See, e.g., Richards v. State, 659 S.E.2d 651, 653 (Ga. App. 2008) (holding that the
smell of chemicals normally associated with methamphetamine manufacturing and a
glimpse of what looks like a meth lab were sufficient to create an exigent circumstance
when there was reason to believe that a child was present); State v. Crabb, 835 N.E.2d
1068, 1071 (Ind. App. 2005) (holding that the smell of ether and the rustling of curtains,
“combined with credible evidence that a small child was on the premises and, thus, being
exposed to both risks from explosions due to the flammability of the chemicals used in
producing methamphetamine and from the effects that ether can have on the respiratory
system,” provided officers with sufficient exigent circumstances to permit officers to make
warrantless entry).
195. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.42.100 (Supp. 2007) (“A person is guilty of the
crime of endangerment with a controlled substance if the person knowingly or intentionally
permits a dependent child or dependent adult to be exposed to, ingest, inhale, or have contact with methamphetamine or ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or anhydrous ammonia, including their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, that are being used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers. Endangerment with a
controlled substance is a class B felony.”). Michigan, Iowa, and South Dakota have also
enacted specific “child abuse by methamphetamine” statutes. See Feature: Methamphetamine as Child Abuse Laws Gain Ground, but Do They Help or Hurt?, DRUG WAR CHRON.,
July 14, 2006, available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/444/drug-child-abuse-laws.
196. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-22.2 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1102(23)(D) (2006). Georgia, Idaho, and Ohio are among the other states that have specific
felonies criminalizing the manufacture of methamphetamine in the presence of a child. See
Feature: Methamphetamine as Child Abuse Laws Gain Ground, but Do They Help or Hurt?,
supra note 195.
197. For example, Washington provides a sentencing enhancement for methamphetamine manufacture where methamphetamine was produced in the presence of a child. See
WASH. REV. CODE §9.94A.827(2) (Supp. 2009).
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abuse statutes, courts have likewise expanded criminal liability,
upholding convictions for child abuse for exposing children to methamphetamine manufacturing, even in the absence of proof of harm
to the child.198
As we saw with maternal use of crack cocaine,199 prosecutors have
sought to use existing child abuse statutes to sanction women who
use methamphetamine during pregnancy.200 As we also saw with respect to crack cocaine,201 courts generally have not permitted such
tactics.202 In one high-profile case, local prosecutors in Hawaii
brought manslaughter charges against a woman whose two-day-old
baby died after she smoked methamphetamine in the days leading up
to its birth.203 She entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the
right to contest the charges, and was vindicated when the Hawaii
Supreme Court rejected the prosecutor’s interpretation of the statute
The extent to which laws of these various types have been or will be effective in limiting the exposure of children to hazardous conditions has not been studied. The number
of children endangered by methamphetamine manufacture, or who enter state child protective service programs because of methamphetamine exposure, is unclear; state departments do not keep statistics, and informal estimates range from half of child abuse cases to
less than one percent. Statutes might protect children from toxic exposure by providing
parents with a manufacturing disincentive or by making unavailable via imprisonment
parents who produce methamphetamine; they might, on the other hand, drive parents who
produce methamphetamine into greater secrecy, or place children who live in environmentally toxic environments in possibly unsafe foster care environments.
198. See, e.g., People v. Toney, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 578, 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding
child abuse conviction when child was found in location where chemicals for the manufacturing of methamphetamine were found without requiring proof that methamphetamine
was actually manufactured there).
199. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. For a recent article decrying the
trend of prosecuting mothers for harms allegedly inflicted on their fetuses, see generally
Linda C. Fentiman, The New “Fetal Protection”: The Wrong Answer to the Crisis of Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 537 (2006).
200. One difference between this wave of prosecutions and those relating to crack cocaine is that this time the community of criminal defense attorneys, public health officials,
and advocates for pregnant women were ready with a concerted legal and scientific response. See generally Meth and Myth: Top Doctors, Scientists and Specialists Warn Mass
Media on “Meth Baby” Stories, July 29, 2005, http://stopthedrugwar.org/
chronicle/397/methandmyth.shtml (gathering medical evidence problematizing link between meth use and fetal health); KING, supra note 10, at 16 (criticizing media’s handling
of scientific and medical data relating to methamphetamine); see also PROVINE, supra note
10, at 165 (noting that media and politicians were much more skeptical about “meth baby”
claims than they had been about “crack baby” stories).
201. See discussion supra note 68. In this context, it is worth noting that the most highprofile homicide conviction against a pregnant woman who used crack cocaine was set
aside on state post-conviction review in 2008, on the grounds that her lawyers were ineffective in failing to present sufficient expert testimony and to fully “investigate medical evidence contradicting the State’s experts’ testimony on the link between cocaine and stillbirth.” McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d 354, 354 (S.C. 2008).
202. See, e.g., cases discussed infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. See also Amos
Bridges, Charge Filed after Baby Born with Meth Traces, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Dec.
29, 2005, available at http://www.csdp.org/news/news/news_mometh_122905.htm (describing
filing of child abuse charges against 19-year-old Missouri woman whose child was born with
traces amounts of methamphetamine in its system).
203. See State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1210-11 (Haw. 2008) (narrating events).
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and reversed her conviction.204 In another heavily followed case, a
judge dismissed child endangerment charges brought against a
Wyoming woman after her newborn child tested positive for methamphetamine.205 In one Oklahoma case, a woman spent two years
in prison awaiting a trial on homicide charges stemming from the
stillbirth of a child born after she ingested methamphetamine during
the late stages of pregnancy, pled guilty to second-degree murder and
received an ostensible fifteen-year sentence, but was released a year
later after completing drug rehabilitation as part of an informal deal
with the prosecutor and the trial judge.206
V. WHY IS THIS PANIC DIFFERENT FROM ALL OTHER PANICS?
If we are in the midst of a methamphetamine panic, it is a panic
that has produced a comparatively temperate result. Why has public
and legislative concern about a drug described in terms of natural
disasters and communicable deadly disease generated cold medication restrictions and educational programs rather than extensive new
criminal law?
A. Some Preliminary Theories
1. Race
The narrative provided by scholars of the crack cocaine legislative
response, as detailed above,207 is largely one of racial panic. Crack cocaine is and was associated with African-American users and sellers,
goes the analysis, and this association facilitated draconian criminal
sanctions and mass imprisonment.208 The “War on Drugs” has largely
been a war on people of color, waged against people citizens and leg204. Id. at 1224-25.
205. See Judge Drops ‘Meth Baby’ Charge, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Sept. 29, 2005, available at
http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_e76def07-3088-527f-8a9a-18f5f05ea9a6.html (detailing case).
206. See Dana Stone, Is Meth Murder Charge Useful?, OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 19, 2007 (narrating story of Theresa Hernandez who spent two years in jail awaiting trial on first-degree
murder charges before pleading guilty to second-degree murder and receiving a fifteen-year
sentence); Jay F. Marks, Woman Was Charged in Her Stillborn Son’s Death — Meth Mom
Wins Early Release, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 20, 2008, at 1A (narrating later developments, including her release).
Creative prosecution strategies have, of course, not been limited to cases involving
pregnant and parenting women. Prosecutors in North Carolina, for example, have charged
persons who operate methamphetamine labs under the state’s antiterrorism “weapons of
mass destruction” statute. O. Dean Sanderford, Terrorism Statutes Run Wild: Methamphetamine and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 82 N.C. L. REV 2142, 2142 (2004). See also Jaime
Holguin, Terror Laws Used vs. Common Crimes: Critics Bothered by String of Increasing
Cases, CBS NEWS, Sept. 14, 2003, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2003/09/14/national/main573155.shtml (noting that a North Carolina man charged
under this law faced twelve years to life in prison).
207. See supra Part III.B.
208. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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islators already fear.209 It is easier to embrace mass incarceration
when you do not identify with the persons incarcerated and to the extent that you do think of them, it is with trepidation. Whether or not
legislators and citizens consciously wish to harm people based on
race, racial unease, antipathy, and panic facilitate the decisions to
prosecute and punish.210
This narrative is appealing as applied to methamphetamine.
While crack cocaine in particular has been associated with African
Americans, and other illicit drugs have historically been linked to
disfavored subgroups, methamphetamine is, accurately, characterized as a drug that is preferred by white populations.211 As white
Americans do not comprise a disfavored racial group, and as there
are no characteristics associated with methamphetamine users (such
as radical politics or generalized social dissent)212 that might otherwise corral them into such a targeted subgroup, we would not expect
to see the sorts of dramatic legislative responses that we have seen in
the past. Unlike Chinese immigrants smoking opium, or Mexican
immigrants smoking marijuana, methamphetamine use does not
stoke racial anxieties.
Media articles and legislative history provide some support for
this argument. The portrayal of methamphetamine addicts in the
popular press often has often been one of pity and sympathy.213 Leg209. Kennedy, supra note 20 at 1258.
210. See supra note 208.
211. Methamphetamine prosecutions have been credited with “whitening” to some extent the federal prison population; in 1994, for example, about 73% of new federal inmates
convicted of methamphetamine offenses were white. See Schone, supra note 129, at 35. By
2005, the data was more ambiguous; while the plurality of those newly convicted of federal
meth offenses remained white, the number was not less than fifty percent. See Motivans,
supra note 116, at 2. While the characterization of methamphetamine as a “white drug”
has been fairly consistent, it has not proven universal. For example, some sources have
linked methamphetamine use with the Native American population. See, e.g., Andrew
Murr & Sarah Childress, A New Menace on the Rez, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 27, 2004, at 30 (offering a story about methamphetamine use on Native American reservations and quoting a
Bureau of Indian Affairs official as arguing that “[m]eth is becoming the drug of choice in
Indian Country”).
212. Cf. supra Part II.A.3 (discussing mainstream culture’s unease about social groups
associated with drug use during the 1960s).
213. See, e.g., Joel Baird, Crazy about METH, DAILEY NEWS LEADER, Sept. 11, 2005 (on
file with author) (profiling methamphetamine user whose methamphetamine use had led
to the dissolution of his marriage and scars from picking his skin; the user described methamphetamine users as “everyday people,” “good people, educated people, uneducated
people; white collar, blue collar; people who drive BMWs, people who drive grandma’s car
that barely runs; housewives who’ve got two kids at home and are tired of washing
clothes”); Melanie Bennett & Chuck Williams, Meth’s Human and Economic Costs are
Enormous, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, Oct. 26, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR
17275992 (describing a man whose methamphetamine use, according to him, led to losing
his land, houses, wife, children, savings, business, vehicles, and ultimately, liberty). David
Sheff, My Son the Addict, OBSERVER, Oct. 23, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 17193468
(describing the author’s son, an upper-middle-class University of California at Berkeley
addict who struggled with methamphetamine addiction before successfully completing a
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islators tell stories about relatives and community members whose
lives have been savaged by methamphetamine use.214 The public and
political discourse about methamphetamine shows a degree of empathy for drug users that far exceeds anything seen in recent drug panics. The narrative that the racial status of persons associated with
the use of methamphetamine—that of the white majority—has driven policy responses is thus an appealing one.
This explanation does not, however, seem fully persuasive. In recent years, it is not just methamphetamine legislation and executive
action that has been characterized by relative restraint, but other
rehabilitation program and obtaining a job writing for an online magazine); Zernike, supra
note 178 (describing Montana Meth Project’s anti-methamphetamine advertising campaign
featuring televised images of a fictional teenager’s blood swirling in her shower drain from
the cuts she has made while picking her skin during methamphetamine, and radio commercials using actual recovering methamphetamine addicts detailing prostituting themselves for methamphetamine and losing their homes and jobs).
Newsweek profiled a police chief arrested for conspiring to produce methamphetamine and cited a scientist who studies methamphetamine as describing “high achievers”
such as college students and law enforcement officials as one of the fastest-growing groups
of methamphetamine users. See Sarah Childress, Crystal Handcuffs: Battling the Meth
Scourge, a Police Chief is Charged, NEWSWEEK, May 16, 2005, at 36.
Newsweek’s controversial methamphetamine cover story, America’s Most Dangerous
Drug, tells the story of one woman in particular:
The leafy Chicago suburb of Burr Ridge is the kind of place where people come to
live the American dream in million-dollar homes on one-acre lots. Eight years ago
Kimberly Fields and her husband, Todd, bought a ranch house here on a wooded
lot beside a small lake, and before long they were parents, with two sons, a black
Labrador and a Volvo in the drive. But somewhere along the way this blond
mother with a college degree and a $100,000-a-year job as a sales rep for Apria
Healthcare found something that mattered more: methamphetamine.
Jefferson et al., supra note 101, at 41. After turning to methamphetamine, Kimberly was
arrested three times for shoplifting, and:
[B]y the time cops came banging on her door with a search warrant . . . Kimberly, now 37, had turned her slice of suburbia into a meth lab . . . . Dressed in a
pink T shirt printed with the words ALL STRESSED OUT, Kimberly looked
about 45 pounds thinner than when police first booked her for shoplifting two
years ago. Her leg bore a knee-to-ankle scar from a chemical burn, and police
found anhydrous ammonia, also used in cooking meth, buried in a converted
propane tank in her backyard. As officers led Kimberly away in handcuffs, her
6-year-old son Nicholas was “only concerned that his brother had his toys and
diapers,” recalls Detective Mike Barnes. Meanwhile, police evacuated 96 nearby homes, fearing the alleged meth lab might explode.
Id.
Mom-and-pop local methamphetamine producers similarly are described in terms
that suggest something other than organized criminal enterprise. As a district attorney in
Georgia told a local newspaper, “I would not classify these as mom-and-pop operations. I
would classify them as idiot operations. These are people who couldn’t pass high school
chemistry.” Chuck Williams & Melanie Bennett, ‘Cocaine Times 10,’ COLUMBUS LEDGERENQUIRER, Oct. 21, 2005, at A1 (quoting Lee County District Attorney Nick Abbott); see also Schone, supra note 129, at 35 (describing mom-and-pop methamphetamine manufacturers as “the plague of Beavis and Butt-Head”).
214. Cf. State Representative’s Son Faces Meth Charge, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., Sept. 2, 2005.
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skirmishes in the “War on Drugs.”215 Crack cocaine, in particular—
the drug which generated a rich literature detailing racialized drug
policy—has enjoyed considerable reconsideration both in statute and
in sentencing policy.216 If the one-way ratchet can turn in reverse for
a drug so closely associated with African-American users, it seems
unlikely that race, while perhaps a partial explanation for focus on
precursor restrictions and treatment programs, provides a full explanation. Ironically enough, the precursor restrictions may end up
themselves testing the disfavored social group hypothesis: as precursors have arguably made it more difficult for mom-and-pop manufacturers to produce methamphetamine in home laboratories, methamphetamine has increasingly been imported from super labs located in
Mexico.217 If methamphetamine becomes associated less with white
215. See supra note 15; infra Part IV.B.
216. See, e.g., Emery, supra note 15 (detailing progress towards repealing crack-cocaine
powder sentencing disparity and predicting that “this may be the year” that the disparity is
eliminated and crack sentences are reduced); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)
(allowing judges discretion to sentence individuals convicted of crack cocaine crimes to lesser
terms based on judges’ personal disapproval of crack/powder disparity).
In an interesting and representative incident, when South Carolina recently decided to
address disparities across penalties for powder and crack cocaine possession (a two-year maximum sentence for simple possession of powder cocaine, in contrast to a five-year maximum
sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine), it did so not by doing what might twenty
years ago have been predicted (simply raise the maximum penalty for possession of powder
cocaine to five years, as drug sentences can only increase), but by lowering the maximum penalty for crack cocaine and raising the maximum penalty for powder cocaine so that both carried a possible three years. See 2005-2006 Bill 16: Include Manufacturing Methamphetamine
as a Violent Crime, S.C. Gen. Assem. http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess116_2005-2006/
bills/16.htm (last updated Dec. 4, 2009) (providing text of Bill and noting its passage).
217. See, e.g., Bennett & Williams, supra note 213, at A1 (reporting on drug sting involving methamphetamine officers believed had been trafficked from Mexico); Sara Jean Green,
U.S. Meth Roundup Snares 24 in Western Washington; 427 arrested in all – Increased Smuggling from Mexico, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005 at B1 (quoting King County Sherriff Su
Rahr as saying “as we’ve shut down the labs, we’re seeing meth coming up and U.S. Attorney
for the Western District of Washington John McKay saying his office has observed “something of a trend” with a “shift from home-cooked methamphetamine” to methamphetamine
“produced in super-labs”); Ryckaert, supra note 142, at A04 (quoting White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy director John P. Walters as saying that “Organized criminals
now produce large quantities of methamphetamine in Mexico and are moving it across our
borders”); Lloyd de Vries, CBS News, Mexican Meth Floods U.S., May 19, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/19/eveningnews/main1636846.shtml (reporting that,
despite a decline in domestic methamphetamine production due to lab raids, “The epidemic of
meth use is still rampant because the drug is still plentiful on America’s streets . . . . This
deadly [methamphetamine] is now a growth industry for Mexico’s deadly drug cartels.
They’re replacing small U.S. kitchen labs with Mexican super labs”); Greenwood Officials Arrest More Suspects in Meth Ring Investigation, WIS-TV, Dec. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.wistv.com/global/story.asp?s=4250657&ClientType=Printable (detailing workings
of major ring importing methamphetamine into South Carolina from Mexico); Lisa Demer,
Meth Ills Expand in Alaska, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 2005, at B1 (noting a shift
from homegrown methamphetamine to methamphetamine imported from Mexico);
ABERDEEN AM. NEWS, Dec. 15, 2005, at B3, available at 2005 WLNR 20102925 (quoting director of the Iowa governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy says that since methamphetamine precursor restrictions were put into place, “organized criminals” are “now producing
large bulk quantities of methamphetamine in Mexico,” and arguing that “[w]e’re being
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stateside producers and users and more with Mexican manufacturers
and importers, we will see if or how the legal response to methamphetamine changes.
2. Media Coverage
A second plausible explanation is that the language used to describe methamphetamine, methamphetamine addicts, and methamphetamine sellers/manufacturers, as employed by the media, legislators, and the public in general, differs in tone and content from the
language that has surrounded past drug panics. Perhaps there simply isn’t a panic; writers, policymakers, and citizens are unperturbed
by methamphetamine. While there are scattered pieces of evidence to
support this claim,218 it ultimately fails to persuade.
It would be difficult to argue that the language surrounding methamphetamine in the media is substantially different in terms of its
emphatic and hyperbolic qualities than it has been during past perceived epidemics of drug use. Articles about methamphetamine use
“epidemic” and “plague” to describe the drug’s use.219 Natural-disaster
language also has characterized the media response to methamphetamine; media sources have pressed the tidal wave disaster analogy into
repeat service, echoing perhaps the language of law enforcement officers describing the perceived entrance of methamphetamine into or
outbreak of methamphetamine use within a state.220 The tornado has
also enjoyed employment as a metaphor for methamphetamine, used
to describe the imminent approach of methamphetamine to areas
where methamphetamine has not yet taken root.221
According to media sources, methamphetamine is—as were the
drugs that anchored past drug “epidemics”—the worst drug of all

killed with ‘Mexican ice,’” which he describes as substantially more pure than locallyproduced methamphetamine).
218. See generally supra note 213 (collecting articles that offer comparatively sympathetic portrayals of methamphetamine users and producers).
219. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 101, at A24; Johnson, supra note 101, at 41. Politicians
have also utilized this language. See, e.g., ABERDEEN AM. NEWS, supra note 217, at B3,
(quoting Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels as saying that “we can trace [methamphetamine’s] path like a plague . . . . If we call this effort to eliminate this problem a war, for
once, we’re not overstating it”). So, too, have academics. See, e.g., O’Connor et al., supra
note 123 (article entitled Developing Lasting Legal Solutions to the Dual Epidemics of Methamphetamine Production and Use).
220. See, e.g., Jill Young Miler & Craig Schneider, When Meth Hits Home: Meth’s Forsaken Children—When Parents Disappear into a Chaotic World of Drug Abuse, Danger and
Heartbreak Follow for Their Sons and Daughters, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 30 2003, at A1
(quoting Georgia Bureau of Investigation Director Vernon Keenan as describing methamphetamine as having entered his state “like a tidal wave”).
221. Lamothe, supra note 119, at A1 (discussing the possibility of crystal methamphetamine becoming prevalent in Massachusetts).
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time, more devastating and addictive than any other drug.222 Media
sources often run “before and after” photos of users to illustrate the
drug’s effects on individuals.223 Methamphetamine in fact has been
described explicitly as “the new crack,”224 the latest drug to take the
crown of most addictive and devastating. “It really has become the
drug of choice. It’s taken over heroin and it’s taken over crack.”225
Media articles also have held methamphetamine responsible for the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases. 226
As we saw in the late 1980s with respect to crack cocaine, media
sources have featured connections between methamphetamine use
and external social effects. As noted above, media reports have highlighted the public health problems associated with methamphetamine production and extent to which methamphetamine producers
endanger household members, children, and neighbors.227 In addition
to describing these physical and environmental dangers, media
sources have detailed criminal offenses in which methamphetamine
addicts engage in order to provide funding for their habits. In particular, articles have focused on information theft (often referred to
222. See, e.g., Jennifer Chambers, Police Offer Testing Kits as Meth Use Accelerates,
DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 15, 2005, at 3B (quoting Oakland County Commissioner Eric Coleman, speaking on behalf of the National Association of Counties, as saying that methamphetamine “is bigger and worse than heroin or cocaine can ever be”); Nancy Lofholm, Arrest Ends Meth-Ring Manhunt: Mesa County for Weeks has been Rattled by Violence Linked
to the Drug’s Widespread Use, DENVER POST, Dec. 13, 2005, at A1 (describing a group of
suspected methamphetamine addicts who “had held Mesa County in a jittery grip of fear
and violence for weeks,” linked methamphetamine to local shootings, and quoting a local
law enforcement officers as saying that methamphetamine “is public safety’s and the community’s worst nightmare” and that “[t]his drug is different . . . . What it does to people is
so much worse than anything else out there”); Marcovitz, supra note 152, at B1 (quoting a
local district attorney as saying that “meth is a killer. It destroys communities. It is not
like any other drug”); Puzzanghera, supra note 128, at A1 (“Law enforcement officials say
[methamphetamine] is the most devastating drug they have ever encountered, hooking
most users the first time they try it.”); A Commission at Work: Public Safety Advisers Have
Their Hands Full in Dealing with Crystal Meth, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Dec. 16,
2005, at A16 (“[Methamphetamine] is far more addictive and far more dangerous stuff than
cocaine, heroine, or other street drugs.”).
223. See sources cited supra note 180.
224. See, e.g., Bruce Ramsey, The Scourge of the New Crack, SEATTLE TIMES, June 14,
2009, at H4 (reviewing REDING, supra note 10); Press Release, U.S. Senate, Schumer: New
Stats Show Crystal Meth Quickly Becoming the New Crack—Seizures in New York Up
31% Over Last Year, (Apr. 25, 2004), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/
new_website/record.cfm?id=265406 (“Crystal meth is becoming the new crack, and we need
tough new penalties that treat it like crack.”).
225. Chambers, supra note 222, at 3 (quoting Police Chief William Dwyer of Farmington Hills, Michigan).
226. See Patricia Guthrie, Drugs, Risky Sex Get Blame for Jump in Syphilis Cases,
Nov. 9, 2005, ATLANTA J. CONST., at A9 (reporting that the Center for Disease Control has
seen a rise in syphilis cases among men who have sex with men, and suggests a link
between methamphetamine use and risky sexual behavior leading to disease
transmission); Jefferson et. al., supra note 105, at 38.
227. See, e.g., Kathleen Brady Shea, 8 Arrested in Methamphetamine Ring,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 8, 2005, at B5.
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as identity theft), a crime which even when uncoupled from methamphetamine generates a fair amount of panic, describing methamphetamine addicts as stealing personal information in order to obtain
money to buy drugs.228 In one newspaper article, a local sheriff estimated that eighty five percent of information theft offenses he investigated were in fact committed by methamphetamine addicts.229 Articles also have linked car thefts to methamphetamine, similarly portraying addicts as stealing cars to raise money for drugs.230 The list of
devastating methamphetamine effects as outlined in media sources is
lengthy, and the language used to describe its effects thus is emphatic. While these stories may or may not be grounded in reality—
figures on crimes related to methamphetamine are not reliable231 and
figures on the percentage of foster cases related to methamphetamine
have proven unverifiable232—it is fairly unpersuasive to argue that to
the extent media might drive police responses, that a change in tone
in media articles is responsible.
3. Alternative Panics
Another explanation for the legal response to methamphetamine
is that we are indeed panicking about crime—but primarily about
other kinds of offenses, particularly sex offenses against children.
During the last two decades, there has been a major expansion of legislation increasing penalties for those who commit sexual offenses

228. See, e.g., Greg Risling, Meth Users Turn to ID Theft to Pay for Habit, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at F4 (“[M]ore and more desperate users of [methamphetamine] are turning to identity theft to pay for their habit, creating a criminal nexus costing
Americans millions of dollars.”).
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, The Distinction Modesto Didn’t Need: National CarTheft Capital, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2006 (noting that Modesto, California leads the nation
in car thefts per capita and largely blaming methamphetamine for that distinction); Janelle, supra note 217 (describing the investigation and arrest of thirty suspects in an alleged methamphetamine distribution ring and noting that the investigation revealed a vehicular “theft ring, a chop shop for stolen cars,” and a counterfeiting scheme).
231. Efforts to evaluate extravagant claims of meth’s effects on crime rates have usually
left the involved analysts skeptical. For one well-reported such effort, see Angela Valdez,
Meth Madness: How The Oregonian Manufactured an Epidemic, Politicians Bought It and
You’re Paying, WILLAMETTE WEEK, Mar. 22, 2006, available at http://www.wweek.com/
popup/print.php?index=7368 (analyzing fourteen stories in The Oregonian that, inter alia, described the proportion of state property crimes “fuel[ed]” by methamphetamine as between 80
and 90 percent and failing to find supporting data to verify the accuracy of this figure).
232. In August of 2005, The Oregonian ran a front-page story with the subheadline: “Oregon’s Meth Epidemic Creates Thousands of ‘Orphans.’ ” See Joseph Rose, The Children of Meth
OREGONIAN, Aug. 28, 2005 at A01. According to the story, a state Department of Human Services study found that half of the state’s foster cases involved children taken “from parents using or
making the potent drug.” See id. There was no such study, and DHS does not track whether or
not methamphetamine causes children to be removed from homes; rather, a DHS coordinator
had compared a list of parents with a list of people who had received methamphetamine treatment and found a 50% correlation. See Valdez, supra note 231.

2010]

METHADEMIC

891

against children233 and imposing onerous new collateral sanctions
upon such individuals.234 A wide variety of academic commentators
have analyzed the legislative history and cultural politics of these
laws and concluded that they are both disproportionate and vindictive, reflecting a predictable desire to take out our collective cultural
anxieties on individuals who we can comfortably dismiss as “monstrous.”235 According to some scholars, we are in the midst—or perhaps
at the tail end—of a full-fledged “sex panic.”236
While one panic does not rule out the possibility of another, it arguably reduces the odds. After all, given the limits of human emotion
and energy, our capacity for moral indignation is not inexhaustible.
Moreover, the creation of cultural images of monstrous offenders who
impose dramatic physical and psychological trauma on vulnerable
children creates a very high standard for those whom might want to
demonize methamphetamine users.237 Next to those who sexually
233. In the most extreme example, a handful of states adopted laws authorizing the
death penalty for certain child sexual offenses. In June 2008, a sharply divided Supreme
Court found that such laws violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008).
234. Here, the most notable development is the growth of sexual offender registration
laws, often called “Megan’s Laws.” Since 1996, every State has had such a statute. See Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 369, 370 n.6 (2009). The Supreme Court upheld two such statutes against constitutional challenges in 2003. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003); Conn. Dep’t Pub.
Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). More recently, we have begun to see an expansion of
laws that limit the ability of convicted sex offenders to live in proximity to places where
children congregate, often to the point that there are few or even no places where they can
legally reside. For one academic analysis of this trend, see generally Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1
(2006).
235. See generally, e.g., Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in
Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315 (2001); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and
the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000); Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL,
PUB., POL’Y & L. 452 (1998).
236. For descriptions of the recent decades as an era of “sex panic” or “sex crimes panic,” see, for example, James E. Bristol III, Free Expression in Motion Pictures: Childhood
Sexuality and a Satisfied Society, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 333, 352 (2007) (describing
“sex panic”); Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan’s Law, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 267,
274 (2006) (describing “sex crimes ‘panic’ ”); Lisa Duggan, Sex Panics, in SEX WARS:
SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 74 (Lisa Duggan & Nan D. Hunter eds., 1995)
(describing “sex panic”). The term “sex panic” is at times used to refer to our heightened
and exaggerated concerns over sex crimes but is more often used to refer to a more general
cultural anxiety about sexual behavior that manifests itself not only in sex crimes legislation but also in laws relating to pornography, obscenity, and gender relations. Used in the
latter sense, the term is more often used with reference to the 1990s than to the most recent years. Id.
237. If, as posited here, the relevant distinction is between those who threaten others—
particularly the vulnerable and most especially children—and those whose behavior mostly
damages themselves, then the shape of methamphetamine legislation described above
makes sense. As discussed in Part II supra, much of the state legislation in response to methamphetamine has been designed to prevent young people from becoming addicted or to
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traumatize children, scraggly, frantic meth users might well appear
more pathetic than dangerous.238
Efforts to import restrictions developed in the sex-offender context
to the meth content have gained little traction. Though some were initially excited by the idea of methamphetamine registries,239 for example, few states have adopted them240 and those that have adopted
them provide less information about those convicted of methamphetamine offenses than upon those convicted of even the most minor
sex offenses.241 With regard to sexual offense registries, there has
been near constant political pressure for more—more states participating, more offenses included, more information provided, more
access for the public, and more restrictions on where persons convicted of sex offenses can reside, work, and socialize. In contrast,
meth registries, as they have developed in the few states that maintain them, are limited tools; lacking photographs or extensive search
features, they serve as little more than free, limited background
checks for potential landlords, employers, and home buyers.
4. Personal Responsibility as Political Focus
The idea of being responsible for one’s own person, decisions, and
fate is hardly novel.242 The mobilization of this concept politically,

protect third parties from explosions and other environmental harms resulting from drug
manufacturing. As discussed in Part III.B supra, situations in which children are harmed
or threatened is the one area in which legislators have been quick to add new criminal laws
and penalties related to methamphetamine.
238. For characterizations of methamphetamine users that emphasize their pathetic
plight, see supra note 213 and sources cited therein.
239. Representative Mike Coan, who introduced legislation to create a methamphetamine offender registry in Georgia, argued that “[t]he registry is necessary because the production, distribution and use of this powerful street drug is the source of so much crime,
ranging from robbery, theft, forgery, child abuse and neglect to a host of violent offenses.”
Mike Coan, My View: Registry for Meth Offenders Would Protect Residents—Metro Atlanta
Area a Major Hub for Trafficking, ATLANTA J. CONST., Feb. 12, 2006 at JJ4. He focused
specifically on the effects of methamphetamine offenses on children, writing that “[j]ust as
sex offenders do irreparable harm to children, meth abusers also harm innocent children.
The addiction to this street drug is so powerful that addicts neglect their families, spend all
their wages buying meth and behave extremely erratically, sometimes abusing children
and spouses.” Id. With a methamphetamine registry, “neighbors can watch for suspicious
activities,” arguing that “[i]nformation is power, and when residents have the ability to
find out who lives in their community—whether it is a sex offender or a meth offender—
they can make better decisions about how they live their lives.” Id. Comparing persons
convicted of sex crimes to persons convicted of methamphetamine offenses, “we must now
take the same steps to ‘out’ offenders who bring this dangerous drug into our communities.” Id.
240. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
242. See generally Michael B. Brennan, Essay, The Lodestar of Personal Responsibility,
88 MARQ. L. REV. 365 (2004) (discussing historical roots of “personal responsibility” as philosophy and observing how the principle is applied in law).
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however, has gained significant traction in recent years.243 This sort
of libertarian impulse perhaps explains some of the legal developments we have seen with respect to methamphetamine. The changes
that legislatures have made that increase criminal penalties for methamphetamine offenses generally focus on protecting “innocent”
persons who have not made bad decisions and who are not in a position to protect themselves.244 This may explain why legislatures have
enacted lengthier sentences primarily where persons associated with
methamphetamine expose others to the dangers of their activities:
nonmethamphetamine producers do not make intrinsically bad decisions by having next-door neighbors or purchasing homes, and children are not making poor decisions when they are raised by methamphetamine producers. The language of self-sufficiency and personal
responsibility in fact can be found directly in press releases supporting these legislative changes.245 This focus may explain why, even if
reducing domestic production were to do little to reduce addiction,
curtailing the number of mom-and-pop methamphetamine labs would
comprise success: shutting down local methamphetamine labs, even
if it does nothing to stem the influx of methamphetamine into communities or the use of methamphetamine by addicts, will be help protect innocents from explosions and toxic chemicals.246
This explanation, like others, cannot be fully explanatory: legislatures are not ignoring the plight of addicts, but rather are allocating
significant funding to educate potential users about the dangers of
methamphetamine and to rehabilitate users through drug courts,
methamphetamine prisons, and other treatment programs.247 Still, to
the extent that the way in which we have been recognizing and dealing with “serious” social problems has been by ratcheting up criminal
penalties, it is possible to view recent legislative responses to me243. For example, the controversial 1996 law that, depending on your perspective, either reformed or eliminated welfare was entitled the “Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.” See Pub. L. No.104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at
42 U.S.C. 1305).In 1999, then-Senator John D. Ashcroft similarly lauded Clarence Thomas
for the extent to which he promotes in his public life notions of personal responsibility.
John D. Ashcroft, Justice Clarence Thomas: Reviving Restraint and Personal Responsibility, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 313, 315 (1999).
244. See generally Parts III.B and IV supra (exploring areas in which legislatures have
chosen to focus their energies in regulating methamphetamine, including prevention, environmental remediation, and child protection).
245. In explaining his support of legislation to provide grant money to states to establish programs to assist methamphetamine-exposed children, for example, Representative
Zach Wamp argued that the legislation would give the children “the helping hand they
need to begin climbing the ladder of life and have an opportunity at the American dream of
self-sufficiency.” Meth-Endangered Children to Benefit from New Grant Program, supra
note 161.
246. An assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of Missouri
commented, “Let the Mexicans have the meth trade. . . . We’ll have done a great thing if we
take pseudoephedrine out of the game.” Schone, supra note 129, at 36.
247. See supra Parts III.B(5)-(6).
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thamphetamine as signaling that while the government will still be
heavily punitive if that is necessary to protect innocent citizens, noninnocents who themselves ingest methamphetamine or are exposed
to the hazards of their own methamphetamine production can be left
to deal with the consequences of their own choices.
5. Privatizing/Outsourcing
Another possible explanation for current approaches to drug policy
is the vogue for privatization and outsourcing—taking traditional
government functions and committing them to private entities.248
Pseudoephedrine purchase restrictions place the burden for reducing
methamphetamine production on private actors who have incentive
for compliance. Police officers have less need to spend precious taxdollars to root out methamphetamine labs in far-flung rural houses.
Instead, drugstore personnel check identification, maintain registries
of purchasers, refuse profit-making purchases as required, and
shelve pseudoephedrine inaccessibly or in view of surveillance mechanisms, all of which represent enforcement costs placed on business rather than on taxpayers.249 In general, governments have
shown a desire to privatize the cost of anti-methamphetamine programs, in some cases shifting primary responsibility for such programs to privately financed campaigns250 and in at least one case
seeking to finance the cost of drug treatment programs through the
sale of special anti-methamphetamine license plates.251
The “outsourcing” of drug restrictions to private industry has
precedent. The first rounds of drug legislation, as described above,252
looked similar to methamphetamine precursor restrictions in that
they were civil requirements placed on doctors and pharmacists to
restrict distribution of possibly dangerous drugs. Even after the primary approach to drug abuse became criminalization and imprisonment, private enterprise was considered a possible means for reducing drug use. During the late 1980s, for example, the Reagan administration encouraged private employers to drug test employees in an
effort to fight the “War on Drugs.”253 Placing such efforts at the center
248. On the trend toward privatization of government functions, see, e.g., Abraham
Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 576 (2009) (“The much-noted current trend in
public administration is toward privatization of public functions.”); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1291-92 (2003) (noting the trend towards privatization in recent decades).
249. See Part III.B(1) supra.
250. See, e.g., supra note 178 (discussing one such organization, the Montana Meth Project).
251. Minnesota Roundup, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Dec. 17, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 20363759.
252. See Supra Part II.A(2).
253. See Larry Martz et al., Trying to Say ‘No,’ NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 1986, at 14 (noting
that then-president Ronald Reagan’s proposals for discouraging drug use included
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of new drug policy is, however, something we have not seen during
the last several rounds of drug panic. Perhaps what we are seeing is,
at least in part, an effort on the part of legislators to find ways to reduce the harms of illicit drugs while placing the responsibility for enforcing new laws primarily upon private parties.
B. An Age of Ambivalence
Though many of these theories provide compelling partial explanations for the response to methamphetamine, even stitched together
they fail to provide a complete explanation. While methamphetamine
users may have benefited from the perception that theirs was a
“white drug,” the prevalence of news stories about Native-American
meth users and Mexican meth merchants have offered levers if the
culture was intent on racializing the drug;254 moreover, poor rural
whites are not exactly the kind of powerful group that can be confident in its immunity from social scapegoating. Similarly, while media
portrayals of methamphetamine users have certainly been more empathetic than portraits of crack cocaine users,255 they have not shied
away from blaming meth users for a myriad of social problems, often
portraying those problems in the most hyperbolic terms.256 While legislatures may have been distracted by our cultural panic against sexually violent offenders,257 history is full of eras in which drug and sex
panics coexisted or even mutually reinforced each other.258 Finally,
while the increasing popularity of arguments focusing on individual
responsibility and the benefits of privatization may well have played
some role in convincing legislators and voters to approve some particular pieces of anti-methamphetamine legislation,259 there is no evidence that the content of the legislation was shaped by these—or any
other—big ideas.
What the legislative responses (and nonresponses) to methamphetamine cataloged in this Article reveal more than anything is an undercurrent of ambivalence about current drug policy. In an undertheorized, semi-rational way, legislators and citizens responding to
methamphetamine were simply less persuaded by the drumbeat of
panic than they were in other recent episodes. While they spoke loud-

requiring certain federal workers to be drug tested, offering federal contractors incentives
to drug test, and generally encouraging private businesses to drug test employees).
254. See sources cited supra notes 211 & 217.
255. See supra note 213 and sources cited therein.
256. See supra note 219-230 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Part V.A(3).
258. For example, the recent crack cocaine panic overlapped with the beginning of the
modern sex crimes panic. See also supra Part II.A(2) (explaining how cocaine panic of the
1930s was fueled, in part, by fears of African-American men raping white women).
259. See supra Part V.A(4).
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ly and acted swiftly against methamphetamine, their response was
more muted and, on the whole, less punitive.
A string of developments since 2005 support this diagnosis of ambivalence. In recent years, both state legislatures and the United States
Sentencing Commission have taken steps to lower crack cocaine sentences in response to longstanding racial equity concerns,260 the Supreme Court has granted trial judges freedom to reject hefty crack cocaine sentences on policy grounds,261 and Congress has moved ever
closer to abolishing the crack/powder sentencing disparities altogether.262 Meanwhile, in a move both symbolic and substantive, New York
has drastically reworked its infamously draconian Rockefeller Drug
Laws,263 while other states have taken similar steps to scale back on
mandatory minimum sentences.264 Voters in nine states in eleven
years have voted to approve initiatives and referenda decriminalizing
medical marijuana.265 Through this all, drug courts and other forms of
alternative sanctions have quietly established a foothold in nearly
every jurisdiction.266 Finally, in early 2009, the White House announced that the federal government would no longer utilize the term
260. For the federal developments, see Cassidy, supra note 10, at 125 & n.176 (detailing Commission amendments and Congressional inaction that allowed amendments to
pass into law). For one representative state development, see supra note 216 (detailing
change in South Carolina law).
261. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (allowing judges discretion to
sentence individuals convicted of crack cocaine crimes to lesser terms based on judges’ personal disapproval of crack/powder disparity).
262. For informed speculation that the disparities may finally be repealed this year,
see Emery, supra note 15. For a list of recent or pending bills proposing to reduce the disparity or eliminate it entirely, see Cassidy, supra note 10, at 133 n.231. Interestingly, all
the legislation now being considered either lowers crack sentences to the levels that currently apply to powder cocaine, lowers crack sentences part of the way towards current
powder cocaine sentences, or sets new sentences for both crack and powder cocaine that are
less severe than the current crack sentences. The direction of sentencing reform also reflects changing times. Cf. Marc Mauer, Race, Drug Laws, & Criminal Justice, 10 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 321, 325 (2001) (noting that, at that time, efforts to equalize
powder cocaine and crack cocaine sentences were taking the form of legislation that “basically says, ‘You want to equalize penalties, we can do that. We will increase the penalties
for powder cocaine and put even more people in prison’ ”).
263. For some of the first such changes, see Ehlers, supra note 132, at 58. For the
more recent and drastic changes, see Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal ‘70s
Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES., Mar. 26, 2009, at A1.
264. In New Jersey, for example, the State Assembly recently adopted a bill to eliminate the State’s strict mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes committed in school
zones (though the State Senate has thus far declined to act). See N.J. Assem. B. 2762,
213th Legislature, introduced May 19, 2008 (permitting judges to place a defendant on
probation or to waive the minimum term of parole eligibility after consideration of the defendant’s prior record, the specific location of the drug offense, whether or not school was in
session at the time of the offense, and whether or not children were present in the area of
the offense).
265. See Brown, supra note 1, at 243-44 (reporting this fact, though noting that this
trend towards decriminalization of medical marijuana may be constrained by Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)).
266. See generally Miller, supra note 169.
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“War on Drugs,” retiring a divisive and militaristic locution that has
been a flashpoint in the cultural struggle over drug policy.267
If our instincts about drug regulation are now more ambivalent
and our policies more balanced, perhaps we have learned something
from prior panics. With regard to methamphetamine in particular,
study, scholarship, and activism surrounding the response to crack
cocaine may have paid dividends in calming the waters during the
early days of the meth panic. For example, when the predictable
“meth baby” headlines surfaced during 2005, warning of an epidemic
of new methamphetamine-addicted and damaged infants,268 public
health advocates were ready with a signed statement by ninety-two
medical researchers and drug policy advocates arguing that “use of
stigmatizing terms, such as ‘ice babies’ and ‘meth babies,’ lack scientific validity and should not be used” noting that “[e]xperience with
similar labels applied to children exposed parentally to cocaine” had
impaired efforts to develop policies and treatments appropriate for
cocaine-exposed children.269 Similarly, when major news sources like
Newsweek and The Oregonian offered sensationalized account of an
emerging methademic, investigative journalists and media critics
were quick to question their unverifiable factual claims and intentionally inflammatory language.270 It is now increasingly common for
politicians to convene hearings or summits to evaluate, in a systematic way, the efficacy of the heavily punitive antidrug measures on
which we have been relying.271
To take a less sanguine view, perhaps it is money that is driving
our newfound ambivalence. In 1986, then-Democratic congressional
campaign chair Tony Coehlo said that Congressional representatives
“intend to bust the budget” on the War on Drugs, which he meant as
a positive sign of commitment to eradicating drug abuse.272 In con267. See Fields, supra note 15.
268. See, e.g., Christine Lagorio, Generation of Meth Babies: Heartland Doctors and
Programs Help Meth-Addict Moms Cope, CBS NEWS, Apr. 28, 2005, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/04/28/eveningnews/main691764.shtml; Bennett & Williams, supra note 213 (quoting a doctor describing babies born to methamphetamine using
mothers as “worse than crack babies”).
269. Letter from Donald G. Miller to Whom It May Concern (July 27, 2005), General
Media Letter on “Meth Babies” and “Ice Babies,” available at http://www.jointogether.org/
resources/pdf/Meth_Letter.pdf.
270. See, e.g., Shafer, Meth-Mouth Myth, in SLATE, supra note 107; Shafer, in SLATE,
Meth Madness, supra note 110; Valdez, supra note 231.
271. See, e.g., David Lerman, Webb Urges Fresh Look at the War on Drugs, DAILY
PRESS , June 20, 2008, at A2 (describing hearing by Joint Economic Committee convened
by Senator Jim Webb to hear testimony from scholars and prosecutors who argue that incarceration has been costly and ineffective as a remedy for drug addiction); Diana Heil,
Meth Use Claims 56 Lives, THE SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Oct. 28, 2005, at C-1 (describing
drug summit convened by State Drug Czar that recommended primarily treatment, prevention, and environmental remediation efforts).
272. Martz et al., supra note 253, at 14. According to Congressional representatives at
the time, money would be no object in fighting the war on drugs. Id.
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trast, budgetary and space constraints make increased incarceration
less appealing in the 2000s.273 For more than a decade, advocates and
scholars have been pointing to the budget-breaking cost of mass incarceration policies.274 The serious economic crisis that has engulfed
this nation in the last two years may have forced states to take notice. Certainly, it is impossible to open a newspaper without reading
a story about the devastating state of particular state budgets.275 In
almost every instance, coverage of state budge woes discusses either
the role that prison costs have played in driving up state expenditures or proposed cuts to prison budgets or both.276 In a time of belttightening and tough choices, spending tens of thousands of dollars a
year to express your moral indignity towards a particular individual
might, to some, come to seem an emotional extravagance.
VI. CONCLUSION
What if they threw a drug panic and nobody came?
While the media, public, and legislatures clearly have identified
methamphetamine use and production as a serious issue worthy of attention and concern, and while hyperbolic anecdotes and naturaldisaster analogies have worked their way into discourse, they have not
leveraged a concomitantly hyperbolic criminal sanctions response.
While we have seen criminal sanctions expand and increase
somewhat in response to methamphetamine, and we have in particular seen movement to protect children and to authorize police to
search with less preclearance and restriction,277 the legislative response has focused on prevention, via restrictions on precursor purchases and education of potential users.278 The focus of legislative
change has been primarily on making it difficult for people to produce
methamphetamine and protecting “innocents” from either trying the
drug or being exposed to substances that are volatile and toxic.
Certainly, the racial differences between methamphetamine users/producers and public perceptions of, for example, crack cocaine
users/sellers can work to explain the differences between the choice
273. See, e.g., Schone, supra note 129, at 32-33 (noting that Missouri’s state budget is
strained, prison beds are filled, and the state lacks both funds and cells to incarcerate
methamphetamine users and producers).
274. See, e.g., id.
275. See, e.g., Solomon Moore, California State Assembly Approves Prison Legislation, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at A19 (reporting on legislation dealing with California budget crisis).
276. See, e.g. id. (reporting that the California Assembly passed a bill that will cut the
state prison population by about 27,000 inmates, saving about one billion dollars per year).
Underscoring that this is an age of ambivalence about drug policy, not an age of retreat,
the article points out that the State Senate passed an even bolder bill but that, after extensive lobbying, the Assembly balked at the broader cuts. See id.
277. See generally supra Part IV.
278. See generally supra Part III.
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to primarily control methamphetamine through limiting pseudoephedrine purchases and the choice to control crack cocaine through
lengthy and mandatory prison terms.279 As methamphetamine supply
shifts to importation rather than mom-and-pop production, and as
that importation is linked to Hispanic importers and illegal immigration, we may see the extent to which race and ethnicity drive legislative action; under the social group theory,280 we will expect to see methamphetamine sanctions rise dramatically, and time will tell
whether or not the prevention-education-personal regulation model is
transitory or trend.
In the meantime, the United States appears to have entered a period in which the appetite for increased drug-related penalties has
waned.281 In part, this may be because of increased panic about violent crime, particularly sex offenses against children; it may stem
from norm shifts that encourage “personal responsibility” and privatization; or it may reflect, related to all of these theories, tight government budgets and a governmental desire to craft programs that
cost little and place the onus on private parties to resolve social problems. In general, legislators and citizens seem more ambivalent
about the ability of incarceration to address the problems associated
with substance use and abuse, and willing to examine strategies that
place less emphasis on costly prison programs and more emphasis on
private industry and individual will.
Is this a positive shift? The efficacy of methamphetamine responses remains to be seen. The general shift in focus from criminal
punishment to education, alternatives to incarceration, and precursor
control may be good news for foes of mass incarceration, and might
represent a rational, evidence-based approach to a substance that inarguably has ill effects. Or perhaps it simply represents a damning of
expectations, some measure of fiscal austerity and economic reality
as applied to government policy. Either way, I argue that what the
response to methamphetamine has shown us is that we have entered
an age of ambivalence—one where we are less certain that harsh
criminal sanctions are the solution to social problems, and one where
we are open to alternatives.

279. See supra Part V.A(1).
280. See supra note 19-20 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part V.B.
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